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ABSTRACT 
Several recent case studies have explored industries in what Kal Raustiala and 
Christopher Sprigman have described as intellectual property’s “negative space”: 
areas in which creation and innovation thrive without significant protection from 
intellectual property law.  These include such diverse industries as fashion, cuisine, 
magic tricks, stand-up comedy, typefaces, open source software, sports, wikis, 
academic science and even roller derby pseudonyms.  Most scholarship in the area 
has focused on case studies of particular industries and social movements that 
occupy IP’s negative space.  This Article looks deeper into the nature of IP’s 
negative space itself, seeking a unifying theory of what makes a type of work well 
suited to IP’s negative space.  The emerging theory sheds light onto what may 
make a lack of protection preferable to protection for certain types of works and 
gives us a new tool for optimizing intellectual property law to promote creation and 
innovation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
American intellectual property law is grounded in incentive theory.  By granting 
exclusivity to creators, the theory goes, intellectual property law enables them to 
profit from their work, thereby creating an incentive for them to create.  For 
copyright and patent law, this rationale is enshrined in the Constitution:  “Congress 
shall . . . promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited 
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.”1  Trademark law, while based in the Commerce Clause, is 
traditionally justified by a similar goal of reducing consumer confusion and 
encouraging a healthy and competitive business environment.2  Thus, the 
presumption underlying intellectual property (“IP”) law is that people need 
monetary incentives to create, and exclusivity provides an avenue for reward.  With 
exclusivity comes the ability to extract fees for one’s work, and people will create 
more if they know that they can do so.  As a result, according to incentive theory, if 
we want to promote creation, we must give creators exclusive rights.3 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 2. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94–95 (1879). 
 3. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (describing the objective of the patent 
monopoly as existing so that “[t]he productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on 
society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy”) 
(quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)); United States v. Paramount 
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object 
in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors 
of authors. . . . [R]eward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of 
his creative genius.”) (internal quotations omitted).  As articulated in these cases, the “incentive” of 
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IP’s “negative space” defies this conventional wisdom.  It takes its name from 
art, where “negative space” is the area surrounding a figure that makes the figure 
stand out: the background against which an object exists.4  In IP law, negative 
space is a series of nooks, crannies and occasionally oceans—some obscure, some 
vast—where creation and innovation thrive in the absence of intellectual property 
protection.5  In art, negative space is as important as the positive space: it defines 
the subject, and brings balance to a composition.  It is, in the words of artist David 
Leggett, “the opposite of an identifiable object,” but at the same time, it “help[s] 
define the boundaries of positive space.”6  In IP law, negative space may do the 
same thing.  Although the boundaries of IP’s negative space are less clear, its very 
existence may help us gain a better understanding of IP law.7 
Many areas of creation function in the absence of intellectual property 
protection.  A smaller group—those residing in IP’s negative space—are enhanced 
by that absence.  Recent case studies have explored a number of these areas, which 
include such diverse industries as fashion,8 cuisine,9 magic tricks,10 stand-up 
 
incentive theory includes not only the incentive to create, but also the incentive to distribute.  This 
stands to reason:  even if creators would continue to create works without intellectual property 
protection, they could still opt to retain them as trade secrets or personal works; indeed, absolute secrecy 
is the only real guarantee that no one will copy one’s work.  Intellectual property provides a measure of 
safety against such copying; thus, one can say that even if it does not provide an incentive to create, 
intellectual property law may still provide an incentive to share such creations.  As a result, when this 
Article discusses the concept of “creation” or “innovation,” it includes not only the creation of a work or 
invention, but also the distribution of that work or invention to others. 
 4. See David Leggett, Enhancing Your Art with Negative Space, TUTORIAL 9 (Oct. 21, 2008), 
http://www.tutorial9.net/resources/enhancing-your-art-with-negative-space/. 
 5. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox:  Innovation and Intellectual 
Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1764 (2006) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, 
Piracy Paradox] (coining and defining the term “negative space” in the intellectual property context). 
 6. Leggett, supra note 4. 
 7. In some ways, the “negative space” metaphor is a flawed one.  Perhaps the greatest difficulty 
with the metaphor is its implication that IP’s “negative space” contains everything that falls outside of 
intellectual property protection, when conventional scholarly wisdom defines IP’s negative space as 
constituting only those areas of creation and innovation that benefit from a lack of intellectual property 
protection.  Those that merely limp along, subsisting despite a lack of intellectual property protection, 
and those that are relatively unaffected by a lack of protection—while they may be in the background of 
IP law’s metaphorical painting—do not fall into IP law’s “negative space.”  Nor is the metaphor perfect 
in the sense that, as described below, the boundaries between IP’s negative and positive space are not 
always clear cut.  I take the metaphor as I have found it, however, and will exploit its rhetorical 
advantage:  like negative space in art, IP’s negative space permits us to see IP’s positive space in a new 
light. 
 8. See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5 (arguing that copying in 
the fashion industry drives rather than chills innovation); Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman, The 
Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2009) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, Revisited] 
(clarifying and expanding on the arguments explored in Piracy Paradox and responding to scholarly 
proposals for legislative reform). 
 9. See generally J. Austin Broussard, An Intellectual Property Food Fight:  Why Copyright Law 
Should Embrace Culinary Innovation, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 691 (2008) (arguing for copyright 
protection for chefs’ innovative recipes as original works of authorship); Christopher J. Buccafusco, On 
the Legal Consequences of Sauces:  Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121 (2007) (exploring the copyrightability of recipes and concluding that 
economic, public policy and cultural considerations counsel against extending copyright protection to 
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comedy,11 typefaces,12 open source software,13 sports,14 wikis,15 academic 
science,16 jambands,17 hip hop mixtapes18 and even roller derby pseudonyms.19 
If we accept the premise of incentive theory, how can these areas exist?  One 
answer is that the prospect of intellectual property protection is only an incentive 
for some creators.  People and businesses create for all sorts of reasons.  Some 
 
recipes); Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norm-Based Intellectual Property Systems:  The 
Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 187 (2008) (arguing that recipes are better protected by self-
enforced social norms than by intellectual property law); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 
13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 44–45 (1994) (reexamining the bargain between copyright holders 
and the public that copyright entails and arguing that nascent industry can be stimulated by lack of 
copyright protection).  See also Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1768. 
 10. See generally Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed:  How Magicians Protect Intellectual Property 
Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC:  A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010) 
(describing the ways in which the magic community has developed social norms that protect intellectual 
property in the absence of IP law). 
 11. See generally Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore):  The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1787 (2008) (arguing that intellectual property law is not a cost-effective way to protect creativity 
of stand-up comedians and that social norms provide a substitute for IP law). 
 12. See Blake Fry, Why Typefaces Proliferate Without Copyright Protection, 8 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 425, 432–37 (2010) (arguing for the continued exclusion of typefaces from copyright 
protection and explaining why that exclusion does not prevent innovation).  See generally Jacqueline D. 
Lipton, To © or Not to ©?  Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Typeface Industry, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 143 (2009) (calling for Congress, the Copyright Office and courts to reexamine the issue of 
typeface copyrightability, and arguing for at most thin protection for digital typefaces). 
 13. See generally, Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, LINUX and the Nature of the Firm, 112 
YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (analyzing the economic and cultural implications of peer production of 
information) 
 14. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Robert G. Kramer & Robert M. Kunstadt, It's Your Turn, but It's 
My Move:   Intellectual Property Protection for Sports “Moves,” 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 765, 766, 774–76 (2009) (arguing that the use of IP rights in sports gives more bargaining 
power to a much broader range of athletes); Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball:  Business 
Methods and Industry Norms, 2009 BYU L. REV. 875, 877 (2009) (arguing that “there should be a 
presumption against considering a process patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 when a norm 
can be found in the relevant industry against patenting the class of innovations at issue.”). 
 15. See generally Jon Garon, Wiki Authorship, Social Media, and the Curatorial Audience, 1 
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 95 (2010) (arguing for a wiki model in which collaboration is encouraged 
but normative expectations of authorship are maintained). 
 16. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology 
Transfer, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:  PROCESS, DESIGN, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93 (Gary D. Lubecap ed., 2005). 
 17. See generally Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll:  What Jambands Can 
Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 653, 676–77 
(2006) (describing the ways in which the jamband community uses social norms to enforce copyright 
law). 
 18. See generally Horace J. Anderson, Jr., “Criminal Minded”:  Mixtape DJs, the Piracy 
Paradox, and Lessons for the Recording Industry, 76 TENN. L. REV. 111, 114, 140–53 (2008) (extending 
Raustiala and Sprigman’s “piracy paradox” from the fashion industry to mixtapes and arguing for a 
model that employs strategic forbearance of copyright enforcement). 
 19. See generally David Fagundes, Talk Derby To Me:  Emergent Intellectual Property Norms 
Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms (October 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(investigating the extra-legal governance scheme used to protect derby names to explain the emergence 
of subcultural IP norms). 
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creators seek direct monetary benefit, some look to the prospect of future monetary 
benefit and for some, monetary benefit is irrelevant.  While true, this answer tells 
us little about how negative spaces arise and how they can come to dominate entire 
industries.  A more helpful answer is that, regardless of the desire for monetary 
benefit, exclusivity is only part of the incentive puzzle.  This approach assumes that 
intellectual property protection promotes innovation and creation, but that 
intellectual property protection is not the exclusive driver of innovation and 
creation.20  For example, some creators may create out of a desire for recognition, 
an interest in community or an ability to avail themselves of first mover advantages 
or network effects.  For each of these, exclusivity—at least as provided under 
current law—may be as much of a hindrance as a benefit. 
If these answers are true—and they surely are—it follows that some types of 
creation and innovation will need intellectual property protection more than others.  
In some areas or for some creators, intellectual property law could fall away 
completely and creation would continue unfazed, or even be enhanced.  Other areas 
or creators might not survive without protection.  Most are some sort of hybrid.21  
This state of affairs has created a world in which some industries rely on 
intellectual property protection; others rely on extra-legal norms that echo 
intellectual property protection; others create contractual schemes that alter the 
terms of intellectual property protection; and still others thrive without any 
intellectual property protection. 
What makes one industry need or want the protection provided by current 
intellectual property law, and another go without?  And what does that tell us about 
the benefits and drawbacks of our current intellectual property laws?  These 
questions are, as yet, unexplored in the negative space literature, which has thus far 
focused predominantly on case studies.22  This Article builds on those case studies 
to explore the nature of negative space itself, seeking a theory that defines what 
makes a type of work well suited to IP’s negative space.  This information, in turn, 
informs our understanding of which elements of the traditional intellectual property 
system work and which do not work—and how the current intellectual property 
system can improve. 
To this end, the Article begins by defining intellectual property’s negative space 
and creating a taxonomy of negative spaces.  This taxonomy includes three 
 
 20. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1586 (2003) (arguing that there are other ex post reward systems for creativity than intellectual property 
law, and that “[i]ndeed, it seems clear that at least some innovation would continue in the absence of any 
patent protection.”). 
 21. We may never be sure that any industry truly needs intellectual property protection to drive 
creation and innovation.  Would the pharmaceutical industry continue to create new drugs even without 
patent protection?  Would artists continue to make and distribute popular music without copyright 
protection?  Both industries are the subject of widespread copying and piracy, but have managed to 
survive, and even thrive.  But it is safe to say that even if these (and most other) industries might be able 
to struggle through without intellectual property protection, they still benefit from it.  By contrast, the 
industries and social movements at the core of this Article are those that seem to prefer or benefit from a 
lack of intellectual property protection under the current IP system. 
 22. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 20; Fagundes, supra note 19. 
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categories: (1) doctrinal no man’s land, where creations fall through the cracks of 
IP protection; (2) areas of IP forbearance, in which creators could receive 
protection, but elect either not to seek protection or not to pursue infringers; and (3) 
use-based carve outs, in which lawmakers have exempted certain types of 
intellectual property use from liability.  Second, the Article explores what makes a 
certain type of creation particularly conducive to low-IP treatment.  The Article 
determines that negative space is likely to arise under the following four 
overlapping conditions: (1) when creation is driven by something other than 
exclusivity-based financial gain; (2) when granting exclusivity would significantly 
harm or deter other creation or innovation; (3) when public or creator interest in 
free access to creations exceeds the risks of diminished exclusivity incentives; 
and/or (4) when creators prefer to reinvest in creation or innovation rather than 
investing in protection or enforcement of intellectual property.  With these 
considerations in mind, the Article explores several observations about how 
intellectual property protection could be improved to provide additional incentives 
to create and innovate. 
I.  WHAT IS IP’S NEGATIVE SPACE? 
Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman, who coined the term IP’s negative 
space, define the term as encompassing any “substantial area of creativity” in 
which intellectual property laws do not penetrate or provide only very limited 
propertization.23  Put differently, the industries in IP’s negative space exist in a 
“low-IP equilibrium,” where intellectual property protection is absent, or largely so, 
but creation continues.24  This does not mean that—as a cynical observer might 
comment—the ease of copying in today’s technological age redefines every 
creative or inventive industry as negative space.  Rather, the premise of negative 
space as I define it is that the absence of strong IP protection not only fails to 
hinder low-IP industries, but actually helps them thrive. 
A growing body of scholarship has explored several industries that, scholars 
contend, exist in such low-IP equilibria.25  Until now, however, IP’s negative space 
has been discussed primarily on an industry by industry basis.  In each case study, 
scholars have carved out particular commercial and creative situations in which the 
absence of strong intellectual property protection may work as a benefit to creation, 
and have explained how those industries prosper without substantial intellectual 
property protection.26  Often, these systems rely on community norms to create a 
sort of “IP without IP” whose contours vary depending on the needs of the 
 
 23. Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1764; Kal Raustiala & Christopher 
Sprigman, Where IP Isn’t, VA. L. REV. BRIEF (Jan. 22, 2007), 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2007/01/22/raustialasprigman [hereinafter 
Raustiala & Sprigman, Where IP Isn’t]. 
 24. Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1764. 
 25. See, e.g., supra notes 8–19. 
 26. See generally id. 
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industry.27  Thus, these case studies contribute to the scholarship regarding the 
emergence of Demsetzian norms in the intellectual property context, and fit well 
within the growing literature concerning the degree to which intellectual property 
law should respond to industry differences.28  They do not, however, consider 
whether, and to what extent, the circumstances associated with IP’s negative space 
may not be industry-dependent, and they do not say much about what might make 
any other industry—or any other creator or work—particularly well suited to low-
IP treatment.  Thus, the time is ripe for a “unified theory” of IP’s negative space. 
Moreover, despite the growth of literature concerning industries that appear to 
occupy IP’s negative space, the boundaries of negative space itself remain 
relatively amorphous.  Throughout the literature, IP’s negative space has been 
identified more by example than by definition.  In order to understand the way 
negative space arises and functions, and to draw normative conclusions from the 
existence of negative space in a general sense, we need to know not only what 
inhabits it, but also how to define its boundaries. 
A.  MAP OF IP’S NEGATIVE SPACE 
As the first step to understanding what makes a particular type of work well 
suited to IP’s negative space, we must know what kinds of environments qualify as 
negative space.  And in order to know what common threads contribute to the 
creation and perpetuation of negative spaces, we must know how it happens, as a 
matter of mechanics, that any areas of potential creation could end up with little or 
no intellectual property protection.  Who decides whether a particular sort of work 
warrants intellectual property protection? 
The answer provides a helpful rubric for conceptualizing negative spaces: once 
we know who is responsible for creating negative space, we can then begin to 
examine their motivations for doing so.  To this end, I posit that IP’s negative space 
can be divided into three low-IP categories.  The first is created by lawmakers.  The 
second is created by intellectual property creators.  The third is created by users in 
cooperation with lawmakers. 
Doctrinal No Man’s Land:  These are areas in which the bulk of creations fall 
completely or substantially outside the boundaries of intellectual property 
protection schemes.  Doctrinal no man’s land is most easily discussed with respect 
to particular industries.  For example, one of the best analyzed areas of doctrinal no 
man’s land is fashion design: most designs are not protected by copyright law 
 
 27. See, e.g., Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 192–96 (describing norms among French 
chefs); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1812–31(describing norms among stand-up comics); 
Fagundes, supra note 19 (describing norms among roller derby participants). 
 28. Howard Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).  See 
generally, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 20; Michael W. Carroll, One For All:  The Problem of 
Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845 (2006) (arguing that IP law must 
manage the costs imposed by giving patent and copyright owners the same rights); Stacey L. Dogan & 
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law and Subject Matter Specificity:  The Case of Computer Software, 61 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203 (2005) (arguing that copyright doctrines should be adapted to deal with 
the special features of the computer software market). 
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(because they are functional), trademark law (because they have not acquired 
secondary meaning) or design patent law (because they are unregistered).29  Other 
areas of doctrinal no man’s land include electronic databases, cuisine, perfume and 
typeface design.30 
Areas of IP Forbearance:  These are areas in which putative intellectual property 
holders forego IP exclusivity by declining to seek protection, declining to pursue 
infringers or engaging in widespread royalty-free licensing.  IP forbearance may 
exist on an industry-wide basis (as in the worlds of stand-up comedy, magic and 
roller derby pseudonyms) or may occupy partial industries (as in popular music, 
open source software and the copyleft movement).31 
Use-Based Carve Outs:  These are areas in which users have the opportunity to 
create negative space by virtue of lawmakers’ decisions to exempt certain types of 
intellectual property use from infringement liability.  These include copyright fair 
use; trademark fair use and nominative fair use; the narrow “experimental use” 
exceptions to patent infringement; and the statutory exemption for practice of 
patented medical or surgical techniques.32  The negative spaces created by use-
based carve outs may be industry specific (in, for example, the textbook and 
medical procedure industries) but are more likely to affect a cross section of 
intellectual property types. 
The boundaries between these categories are more porous than this stark 
enumeration might suggest.  For example, although the fashion industry exists 
largely in doctrinal no man’s land, it also provides an example of IP forbearance.  
This is because most fashion designs are excluded from the margins of copyright 
and trademark law, but many are at least theoretically amenable to design patent 
protection.33  Thus, most designs remain unpatented by designer choice as well as 
doctrinal exclusion. 
The fashion industry also demonstrates how difficult it is to fix a precise 
boundary between IP’s negative and positive spaces.  The blurriness arises because 
IP’s negative space is a low-IP zone rather than a no-IP zone.  Although the fashion 
industry is considered a prime example of IP’s negative space, it is not an IP-free 
realm.  Certain elements of fashion—such as fabric patterns and cosmetic 
 
 29. Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1698–1705. 
 30. See, e.g., Buccafusco, supra note 9, at 1124–27; Fry, supra note 12, at 430–36; Raustiala & 
Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1770, 1772–73. 
 31. See Fagundes, supra note 19 (discussing roller-derby pseudonyms); Eric E. Johnson, 
Rethinking Sharing Licenses for the Entertainment Media, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391 (2008) 
(discussing copyleft and automatic licenses); Loshin, supra note 10 at 18–24  (discussing magic); Oliar 
& Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1794–1808 (discussing stand-up comedy).  See generally Anderson, 
supra note 18 (discussing hip hop mixtapes); Benkler, supra note 13 (discussing open source software); 
Schultz, supra note 17 (discussing jambands). 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2006) (defining classic “descriptive” trademark fair use); 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2006) (defining copyright fair use); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006) (defining experimental use exception); 
Id. § 287(c) (providing an exemption for practice of patented medical or surgical techniques); see also 
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (1992) (defining nominative fair 
use of a trademark). 
 33. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1704–05. 
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ornaments—are protected by copyright.34  Trademark law protects not only 
insignias, but also fashion designs themselves, to the extent that those designs 
acquire secondary meaning as source identifiers.35  Design patents protect designs 
when makers elect to register them.36 
To some extent, therefore, “negative space” in IP law is a misnomer when 
compared to its art school namesake: although low-IP environments can be 
distinguished from high-IP environments, they do not clarify the boundary of IP 
law.  If anything, they obscure it.  These areas are particularly ill defined at the 
margins where IP law could control, but does not or where IP law does control, but 
only sometimes.  To determine what makes an environment “negative space,” as 
opposed to merely an area protected or unprotected by intellectual property law, it 
will help to explore how each type of low-IP environment arises. 
It is important to note that existence in a low-IP zone does not, in itself, render 
something “negative space.”  To qualify as existing in IP’s negative space, an 
industry must not only exist in a low-IP environment, but must also thrive there.  
Thus, here I examine only what creates low-IP environments.  In the following 
Section, I examine what might make something thrive in one.  Put differently, here 
I examine who creates low-IP environments; in the next Section, I examine why 
they might wish to do so. 
1.  Doctrinal No Man’s Land 
Recent scholarship has exploded with case studies of industries that thrive in the 
low-IP conditions of doctrinal no man’s land.37  In these industries, scholars 
observe, intellectual property law provides minimal, if any, protection for the core 
product or process that supports the industry, but the lack (or constructive lack) of 
intellectual property protection seems to promote creation rather than hinder it.38 
One of the most recognized pockets of doctrinal no man’s land—and the origin 
of the term “negative space”—is fashion design.39  Copyright law does not protect 
against copying most fashion designs because, as clothing, the fashion designs are 
deemed functional.40  Thus, copyright protects only those rare elements of a 
 
 34. See id. at 1699–1700. 
 35. See id. at 1700–04. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See supra notes 8–19.  For the most part, these case studies have examined these low-IP 
pockets on an industry by industry basis.  This stands to reason.  It is much more practical, for example, 
to observe the workings of the fashion industry than it is to assess the effect of copyright’s 
nonfunctionality requirement on creation more generally.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (providing 
copyright nonfunctionality requirement). 
 38. See supra notes 8–19. 
 39. See generally, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of 
Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (arguing for a limited right against design copying); Raustiala & 
Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5; Lisa J. Hedrick, Note, Tearing Fashion Design Protection 
Apart at the Seams, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 215 (2008) (cautioning against adding copyright 
protection for fashion designs). 
 40. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (excluding “useful articles,” namely articles “having an intrinsic utilitarian 
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information,” from 
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garment’s design that are physically and conceptually separable from the garment’s 
function as clothing, such as fabric patterns and logos.41  (The same is true of other 
fashion products, such as shoes, handbags, hats and eyeglasses.)42 Trademark law 
has a similar nonfunctionality requirement.43  In addition, because fashion designs 
are product configurations, trademark law does not protect against copying even the 
nonfunctional elements unless they have acquired “secondary meaning” as source 
identifiers.44  Design patent law can protect fashion designs, assuming they are 
registered, but even for designs that are sufficiently distinct from the prior art to 
qualify for design patent protection, registration can take longer than the fashion 
cycle would permit:  by the time a patent issues on a particular design, it can easily 
have gone out of style.45  Thus, under U.S. law, fashion designs often fall between 
the cracks of IP protection.46 
Furniture designs—aside from those few popular and distinctive enough to 
acquire secondary meaning as source identifiers—fall through the same cracks.47  
Indeed, although trademark law provides protection for any nonfunctional product 
configuration that achieves secondary meaning as a source identifier, and design 
patent law provides protection for the ornamental elements of registered industrial 
designs, scholars have repeatedly asserted that the field of industrial design is a 
low-IP environment.48  These scholars assert that the barriers to receiving 
 
copyright protection). 
 41. Id. (“[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a [copyrightable] work only if, 
and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the 
article.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Eliya, Inc. v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, 2006 WL 2645196, at *8–12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 
2006) (explaining that shoes, as functional items, are useful articles and their design is therefore not 
protectable by copyright law). 
 43. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (explaining that a 
design element is functional, and thus not protectable by trademark law, if it is “essential to the use or 
purpose of the article” or if it “affects the cost or quality of the article”). 
 44. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000) (explaining that 
product configurations cannot be “inherently distinctive” and thus are not protected as trade dress until 
they have acquired secondary meaning as source identifiers).  It is possible for a fashion design to 
acquire distinctiveness, but in light of the rapid transformation of original ideas into fashion trends of 
similar looking items, it is quite rare.  See Raustiala & Sprigman, Where IP Isn’t, supra note 23, at 3 
(discussing and demonstrating the difficulty of acquiring secondary meaning even in such signature 
designs as the “Chanel” jacket and the Christian Louboutin platform pump). 
 45. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1704–05. 
 46. The same is not always true outside the United States.  The European Union has a system of 
low-formality registration that results in “pervasive but unutilized regulation”:  although designers could 
take advantage of European protections, they often do not.  See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, 
supra note 5, at 1741–42.  But see Silvia Beltrametti, Evaluation of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act:  
Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?  An Analogy with Counterfeiting and a Comparison with the 
Protection Available in the European Community, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 147, 148 (2010) 
(suggesting that European designers’ use of the design protection system is growing).  Australia and 
New Zealand have similar, and similarly underutilized, systems.  See generally Rob Batty, There Goes 
My Outfit:  Copyright in the Fashion Industry in Australia and New Zealand, 15 NEW ZEALAND L. & 
BUS. Q. 8 (2009). 
 47. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1769. 
 48. See, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & 
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protection—the functionality bar for copyright, the secondary meaning requirement 
for trade dress and the registration formality for design patents—are sufficiently 
stringent as to exempt large swaths of industrial design from protection.49  These 
barriers mean that even in the areas in which industrial design does not reside in 
doctrinal no man’s land, it is often the subject of IP forbearance. 
Cuisine—both recipes and actual food—also fall into doctrinal no man’s land.50  
Most large-scale food companies protect their recipes as trade secrets, but chefs 
more readily publish or share their recipes.51  Although such recipes are fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression, they fall through the cracks of IP protection: the 
nonfunctional elements of a cookbook—descriptions, and even word choice in 
instructions—are protectable, but the recipes themselves (which consist of 
ingredients, proportions and procedures) are functional, and therefore escape 
copyright protection.52  And although some recipes could conceivably be patented, 
most are probably not different from the prior art in a way that would justify patent 
protection.53  The tangible and consumable results of these recipes, known as 
“built” food, also evade protection.54  Perfumes fall through similar doctrinal gaps 
as cuisine.55  Many perfume formulas are protected as trade secrets or patented as 
chemical formulas, but because the same fragrance can be created using different 
chemical formulations, reverse engineering of scents is both feasible and 
 
ENT. L. J. 1105, 1116–25 (2008) (arguing that industrial design exists in a doctrinal no man’s land).  
Notable exceptions to this principal are semiconductors and boat hulls, whose industrial designs are 
subject to sui generis statutory copyright protection.  See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 
17 U.S.C. §§ 901–04 (2006); Vessel Hull Design Protection Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–32 (2006). 
 49. See, e.g., Afori, supra note 48, at 1116–25. 
 50. See generally Broussard, supra note 9 (arguing that original recipes created by chefs should 
be copyrightable); Buccafusco, supra note 9 (finding that the expansion of copyright law to include 
culinary dishes would be unnecessary and inappropriate in light of the Constitution’s goals); Fauchart & 
von Hippel, supra note 9 (using French chefs as a means to explain the existence and prevalence of 
social norms-based intellectual property systems, which serve as a complement to and substitute for 
law-based intellectual property systems); Litman, supra note 9, at 44–46 (providing a cursory look at the 
relationship between fashion and copyright law, which mirrors copyright law’s disconnect with the 
culinary arts); see also Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1768 (characterizing 
food as another of intellectual property law’s “negative spaces”). 
 51. See Buccafusco, supra note 9, at 1149. 
 52. See Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 188 (identifying social norms that function as 
quasi-IP to protect a chef’s interests:  1) “a chef must not copy another chef's recipe innovation exactly”; 
2) “if a chef reveals recipe-related secret information to a colleague, that chef must not pass the 
information on to others without permission”; and 3) “colleagues must credit developers of significant 
recipes [or techniques] as the authors of that information.”); see also Buccafusco, supra note 9, at 1151–
54 (discussing “culture of hospitality” among chefs paired with strong and internally enforced norms 
“assigning credit to innovators and blame to plagiarists”).  But cf. Lapine v. Seinfeld, 375 Fed. Appx. 81 
(2d Cir. 2010) (holding that similar elements among two cookbooks aimed at parents were unprotectable 
ideas, or “scenes a faire,” and thus not protectable under copyright law, and that the books were not 
confusingly similar as a matter of trademark law). 
 53. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1765 n.156 (discussing the 
patentability of recipes). 
 54. Id. at 1765; see also Jessica Nicole Cox, Note, Why Coca-Cola's Fictional Lawsuit Against 
Coke Zero for Taste Infringement is a Losing Battle, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 121, 129–30 (2009) 
(discussing miniscule potential for protection of flavor as a sensory trademark). 
 55. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1772–73. 
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common.56 
Another noted type of work that resides in doctrinal no man’s land is the 
electronic database.  Under U.S. law, electronic databases are only lightly 
protected.57  Although the trade dress and expression of a database interface may be 
protected by trademark and copyright law respectively, the underlying material is 
subject to copying without recourse to intellectual property law.58  Such database 
information lacks the core elements of trademark and patent law, and is generally 
understood not to meet the “originality” requirement of copyright law, as it consists 
of facts, rather than expression.59  Thus, while the configuration of a database may 
be protectable, the data inside it are not.60  Like fashion, electronic databases are 
subject to a protection regime in Europe, but the U.S. database industry is growing 
faster than Europe’s despite, or perhaps because of, weak U.S. protection.61  Maps 
are similar—their expression is often minimal and their facts are readily copied—
yet to the extent the map publishing business suffers, it appears to be because of 
improved interfaces like those of Google Maps, MapQuest and automotive GPS 
devices, rather than because they lack intellectual property protection.62 
As databases may reside just outside the “originality” border of copyright law, 
entertainment idea submissions often reside just outside its “idea/expression” 
border.63  Thus, entertainment ideas are easily susceptible to copying without 
recourse.64  Yet there is no shortage of new entertainment ideas or creators striving 
to break into the entertainment industry.65  Pitch creators may hope that they are 
protected by an implied oral contract, although contract claims are subject to 
possible preemption, and creators often sign such rights away.66  In other words, 
despite knowing that their ideas can be “stolen” more or less with impunity, there is 
 
 56. Id.; see also Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568–70 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that the 
manufacturer of a perfume may market its perfume as a duplicate of nonpatented, name brand perfume 
so long as the manufacturer did not misrepresent or create a reasonable likelihood that purchasers would 
be confused as to source, identity or sponsorship of the manufacturer's product). 
 57. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1770. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See, e.g., Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991) (“That 
there can be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood.”). 
 61. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1770. 
 62. See Lipton, supra note 12, at 191–92 (discussing thin intellectual property protection for 
maps). 
 63. See Lindsey Weisselberg, Comment, Sui Generis Genius:  How the Design Protection Statute 
Could Be Amended to Include Entertainment Pitch Ideas, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 184, 
187–90 (2009) (noting that the entertainment industry suffers from inadequate legal protection for 
ideas). 
 64. See Stefan Bechtold, The Fashion of TV Show Formats, Workshop on the Law & Economics 
of Media & Telecommunications (forthcoming June 2011) (regarding the “IP without IP” that has 
developed surrounding reality show formats and arguing that such formats are subject to a fashion 
cycle). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 263–65 (Cal. 1956) (establishing implied contract theory 
for idea submission claims); also see, e.g., Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. 
Cal. 2000) (holding that state idea submission claim was preempted by federal copyright law). 
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a steady parade of aspiring creators submitting ideas.  Like the other industries 
above, these creators are not acting from altruism or a sense of community.  Nor 
are they acting solely on the promise of benefit to come when their ideas are 
developed into expressions; they want to be paid for the unprotectable ideas they 
submit just as fashion designers want to be paid for the garments they design.  
Indeed, most expect to be paid as a condition of having their idea developed into a 
protectable expression.67  Most of the time, producers either buy the pitched idea or 
decide not to use it.68  Alternatively, sometimes a producer will use a pitched idea 
without payment, and sometimes disputes arise over the ownership of ideas.  This 
variety of outcomes demonstrates that the system creates new entertainment ideas 
without the guarantee of IP ownership.69 
Typefaces, both electronic and physical, have also received scholarly attention 
for their idiosyncratic place outside IP protection.70  It is generally accepted that 
typefaces, as utilitarian articles, are not subject to copyright.71  Some typefaces 
receive trademark protection, but such protection does not necessarily inure in the 
typeface creator—it goes to the entity that creates a consumer association between 
the typeface and a particular product or service.72  For example, a particular 
typeface is associated with the Coca-Cola brand and another is associated with the 
Star Trek entertainment franchise.73  For the most part, however, typefaces live 
outside IP protection.  Scholars have suggested that this low-IP state is beneficial 
for the development of new typefaces, partly because of a sort of fashion cycle and 
partly because of network effects that drive typeface popularity.74  The industry 
thrives, despite an ever-increasing capacity for copying, through a combination of 
 
 67. See generally David M. McGovern, What Is Your Pitch?:  Idea Protection is Nothing but 
Curveballs, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 475 (1995) (discussing various theories under which “idea men” 
seek compensation for ideas not protected by copyright). 
 68. See id. at 506 (“[T]he policy of paying for good ideas is nothing new for the entertainment 
industry.  Ideas have been, and will continue to be, purchased in the form of completely developed 
scripts; of undeveloped, abstract ideas; and of moderately developed ideas, fleshed out as ‘spec’ 
scripts.”). 
 69. Lindsey Weisselberg proposes that a sui generis form of protection, like the Vessel Hull 
Design Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–32 (2006), be implemented to protect submitted 
entertainment ideas.  See Weisselberg, supra note 63, at 187–90.  I suggest that submitted entertainment 
ideas exist in a low-IP equilibrium that does not require change. 
 70. See generally Fry, supra note 12 (arguing against the copyrightability of typefaces in spite of 
their uniqueness and the innovation behind their development); Lipton, supra note 12 (examining 
questions surrounding copyright law and the digital typeface industry, traditionally conceived of as 
occupying IP’s “negative space”). 
 71. See Fry, supra note 12, at 432–37 (explaining the difficulty of affording copyright protection 
to typefaces whose functional characteristics cannot practically be severed from their aesthetic 
characteristics).  But see Lipton, supra note 12, at 152–55 (arguing that typefaces should be 
copyrightable under current law). 
 72. See Lipton, supra note 12, at 183. 
 73. See id.; see also STAR TREK, Registration No. 1,799,214 (filed Feb. 19, 1993) (showing 
typeface associated with Star Trek).  Although such typefaces are outside the scope of this Article, their 
existence—the fact that some typefaces may have a trademark meaning and others do not—highlights 
the potentially arbitrary nature of IP’s negative space. 
 74. See Fry, supra note 12, at 474–78 (discussing the fashion cycle for typefaces). 
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technological protections and norms against verbatim copying.75 
Other industries surely reside in doctrinal no man’s land, but have not received 
attention from scholars.  These include geographic indicators, craft patterns and 
blank forms. 
2.  IP Forbearance 
IP forbearance occurs when traditional intellectual property protection is 
available to creators, but those creators commonly opt either to forego protection, 
or not to pursue infringers.  Creators may engage in IP forbearance for a number of 
reasons, which I will discuss in greater detail below. 
One of the most studied areas of IP forbearance is the open source software 
movement.76  There is little question that in many instances, the creators of open 
source software could obtain copyright, and often patent, protection on many of 
their creations.77  Yet, open source devotees engage in widespread, royalty-free 
licensing of their work and enter into contractual arrangements that foster 
interoperability by forswearing patent rights.78  In a way, the open source software 
movement, and its siblings in the creative commons, science commons and copyleft 
communities, rely heavily on the existence of intellectual property laws.  They are 
based on licenses, and thus cannot exist without some underlying intellectual 
property right (e.g. copyright and patent) to license.79  But as a cultural and 
practical matter, such licenses seem to function as a sort of copyright 
relinquishment, built on a theoretical foundation of creation and sharing without 
direct monetary remuneration.80  Instead of cash, creators are rewarded with such 
intangibles as recognition, personal pride and the superior product that tends to 
result from collaborative creation.81  Similar considerations likely motivate the 
 
 75. See id. (discussing norms in the typeface industry, including why and how they are enforced); 
Lipton, supra note 12, at 188–91.  Both Fry and Lipton note that in the digital age, such norms are at 
ever-increasing risk of breaking down.  As a result, Lipton suggests, typefaces may not remain a 
“negative space” for long.  Id. 
 76. Many scholars have written on the benefits of IP forbearance in the context of the free 
software movement.  See generally, e.g., Benkler, supra note 13 (arguing that the free software 
movement is an example of a broader commons based peer production, which has advantages over 
markets and managerial hierarchies). 
 77. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1770–71. 
 78. See, e.g., Free Software Foundation, Inc., GNU General Public License (June 29, 2007), 
GNU OPERATING SYS., http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html; News Press Release:  Microsoft and 
Linspire Collaboration Promotes Interoperability and Customer Choice (June 13, 2007), MICROSOFT, 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2007/jun07/06-13LinspirePR.mspx?rssfdn=Press%20 
Releases (regarding Microsoft/Linux collaboration, which includes a patent forbearance pact). 
 79. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?  Accommodating Intellectual Production 
Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437, 1449 (2010) [hereinafter 
Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?] (noting that creative commons and similar licenses are premised on the 
existence of underlying intellectual property protection). 
 80. See Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely:  On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as 
a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 321–30 (2004) (discussing studies of 
motivation among creators of shared works). 
 81. See id. 
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legion of bloggers, essayists, home video makers, photographers, wiki contributors 
and others who post their works on the Internet without concern for copying, or 
even to encourage viral copying, of their work.82 
Many academics in both science and the humanities also thrive without 
exercising intellectual property rights.83  That is not to say that scholars do not 
benefit financially from their works’ eligibility for intellectual property protection.  
Academic scientists, for example, may benefit from their schools’ Technology 
Transfer departments, which obtain patents on researchers’ work and, in turn, 
license those patents to fund further academic research.84  But such benefits are 
indirect, and academics have long inhabited a world in which plagiarism (i.e., 
copying expressions or unprotectable ideas without attribution) has been a greater 
concern than infringement (i.e., copying expressions or inventions without 
payment).85  Indeed, although academic scientists may be pressured by their own 
institutions to create research suitable for patenting, the acquisition of such 
exclusive rights may come at a social and professional cost to the scientist in the 
broader community.86  Academics in the humanities routinely post their works for 
no cost download at sites like the Social Science Research Network (“SSRN”).  
Academic presses—which rely on book and journal sales for their profits and thus, 
one imagines, might wish to prevent copying—freely countenance not only 
academic photocopying and liberal quotation as required by copyright fair use, but 
also often permit reposting on such free download sites.  To date, for example, only 
a small proportion of the articles posted on SSRN have a fee associated with 
download.87  Given the importance of recognition in academia, one can easily see 
why academics would wish to disseminate their works at no cost.  Publishers may 
 
 82. See Garon, supra note 15, at 116–17 (explaining benefits, including and extending beyond 
monetary benefits, of open source licensing). 
 83. See generally Strandburg, supra note 16; Fiona Murray et al., Of Mice and Academics:  
Examining the Effect of Openness on Innovation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
14819, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14819.pdf. 
 84. See Strandburg, supra note 16, at 108 (discussing benefits and shortcomings of technology 
transfer as a possible funding source for academic scientists). 
 85. See Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due:  The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. 
L.J. 49, 61–62 (2006).  Several scholars have observed an erosion of negative space in academic science 
since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, which permitted universities to profit from the inventions of 
academics and, in turn, permitted universities to steer academics toward patent protection rather than 
sharing norms.  See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research:  Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 109 (1999); Strandburg, supra note 16, at 94.  This erosion 
does not undermine the usefulness of studying academic science as a negative space, but it does 
highlight (1) the fragility of negative spaces and (2) the complications to negative space that arise when 
intellectual property creators and intellectual property owners have different priorities. 
 86. See Strandburg, supra note 16, at 108–09.  Strandburg writes: 
Researchers may also have penalties imposed on them by the research community if patenting of 
a particular discovery is viewed as a violation of the communalism norm that requires making 
research results freely available to the community . . . . [Such] sanctions . . . may include loss of 
esteem, but probably more importantly might include denial of the scarce resources of research 
funding and attention. 
Id. 
 87. See Gregg Gordon, Fee Based Partner Publications, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, 
http://ssrn.com/update/general/partners.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2011). 
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be driven by similar needs for scholarly attention and prestige.88 
Several other categories of artists and performers have also received scholarly 
attention as denizens of IP’s negative space by dint of IP forbearance.  As a 
doctrinal matter, stand-up comedians’ jokes and routines are literary works and are 
protected under copyright law when they are fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression.  As a practical matter, however, copyright law “does not play a 
significant role in the market for stand-up comedy.”89  Comedians generally follow 
industry norms against copying, and when they do not, they may be socially and 
professionally punished within the comedic community, but they do not get sued.90  
Similarly, magicians—although their tricks and performances are capable of 
protection under patent law and may be protected as trade secrets—prefer to rely 
more on anticopying and secrecy norms to protect their innovations than they do on 
IP doctrines.91  Tattoos and other pictorial body art are copyrightable works and are 
frequently copied, but are seldom the subject of copyright disputes.92  Jambands 
also routinely permit bootleg recording of their performances, even going so far as 
to permit bootleggers to run their recording equipment through the sound board, 
forgoing the potential profit from exclusive sales of live recordings when 
bootleggers sell or share copies of their live recordings.93  In addition to 
demonstrating their own IP forbearance, the willingness of jambands to have their 
performances bootlegged also facilitates—or even induces—infringement of works 
owned by record companies, but to date, there appear to be few repercussions.  The 
implication is that record companies consent to, or at least do not categorically 
object to, bootlegging behavior in the jamband community.94 
 
 88. See Strandburg, supra note 16, at 95 (“scientists are more likely to respond to opportunities 
for greater scientific productivity and autonomy than to wealth maximization per se”), 101 (“most 
scientific researchers work collaboratively . . . [to be] part of the ongoing conversation between 
researchers. . . . Participating in this conversation means getting the attention of other researchers”); 
David C. Yamada, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Practice of Legal Scholarship, 41 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 121, 130–31 (Fall 2010) (describing the “ranking” instinct that may encourage publishers to permit 
free distribution of works through services that tally and rank downloads of articles). 
 89. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1798 (discussing norms in stand-up comedy). 
 90. Id.; see also Interview with John Rogers, Former Stand-up Comedian, in Van Nuys, CA (Oct. 
23, 2010) (relating story in which several Canadian comics informed Rogers that another comic had 
been performing material similar to Rogers’ own, and how, without Rogers’ prior knowledge, the 
community had ostracized that comic as a result). 
 91. See Loshin, supra note 10, at 130–34 (discussing the flaws of patent and trade secret law, 
respectively, in protecting magic tricks). 
 92. See Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body:  Intellectual Property 
Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 103 (2003) (describing 
original works embodied in tattoos as seemingly copyrightable); Jordan S. Hatcher, Drawing in 
Permanent Ink:  A Look at Copyright in Tattoos in the United States, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK 7–19 
(Apr. 15, 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=815116 (discussing issues in 
copyrighting tattoos). 
 93. See Schultz, supra note 17, at 676–77.  Of course, outside the jamband culture, musical 
performers commonly profit from live recordings—some, like the band Pearl Jam, release for-profit box 
sets of bootleg style recordings.  See Darren Davis, Breaks Its Own Chart Record, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 
7, 2001, 4:00 PM), http://new.music.yahoo.com/pearl-jam/news/artist-name-pearl-jam-id-1020778-
breaks-its-own-chart-record--12055527 (detailing commercially released Pearl Jam bootlegs). 
 94. Id. (describing jambands’ practice of allowing and facilitating tapers); see also Symposium, 
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Scholars have also observed that, as a matter of existing law, there is nothing 
standing in the way of protection for sports “moves” and techniques.95  Yet 
although innovative sports maneuvers such as the curve ball, and the “Fosbury 
flop” high jump technique were all original and game changing when first created, 
none is protected by intellectual property law.96  Under the doctrine articulated in 
Bilski v. Kappos, any original sports maneuver could be eligible for patent 
protection as a business method patent—assuming the invention is a process of 
playing a sport that lacks invalidating prior art—yet athletes generally do not seek 
such protection.97  Patent law is not the only possible avenue for protection: any 
sports move that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression (a task as easy as 
making a home video) can be protected by copyright law, and nonfunctional moves 
capable of serving as source identifiers can be protected as trademarks.98  This is a 
rare, but conceivable scenario; take, for example, the distinctive look of the “Ickey 
shuffle” touchdown celebration dance.  Unsurprisingly, athletes and dancers persist 
in creating new techniques, but rarely take advantage of potential protections for 
their moves.  When they do, it receives attention.  See, for example, the hubbub 
over the patent “Method of Swinging on a Swing,” or over Bikram Choudhury’s 
copyright in the specific sequence of yoga moves he developed.99  Why?  Scholars 
have proposed that good sportsmanship and artistic integrity require that when a 
new technique is developed, anyone capable of performing it be permitted to do 
so.100 And most of the time, sharing is good for the industry and for those who 
 
Intellectual Property and Social Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1275, 1300 (2007).  Keith Aoki said: 
The [Grateful] Dead were the world’s largest grossing touring band, and they were not really into 
pushing vinyl. . . . For fans seeking the Dead experience, seeing the Grateful Dead live was the 
only way to scratch that itch.  On top of it, the Dead, allowing fans to plug their recorders into 
the main mixing board so fans could take away high-quality recordings of the live 
Dead . . . shows a band can make a lot of money by offering something other than a commodity-
widget, i.e., a record, for sale. 
Id. 
 95. See generally Kieff et al., supra note 14.  See also Magliocca, supra note 14, at 875–76; 
Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1774. 
 96. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 276 (2000) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Business Method Patents] 
(“What, for example, if Candy Cummings had patented the curve ball or Dick Fosbury, his high jump 
‘flop?’”). 
 97. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228–29 (2010). 
 98. Kieff et al., supra note 14, at 776–81 (discussing copyright protection for sports moves), 781–
84 (discussing trademark protection for sports moves). 
 99. Method of Swinging on a Swing, U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000); see Jeff 
Hecht, Boy Takes Swing at US Patents, NEW SCIENTIST (Apr. 17, 2002, 10:23 AM), 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn2178-boy-takes-swing-at-us-patents.html (the patent, obtained by 
a five year old inventor, “has generated a mixture of chuckles and frustration at an overworked patent 
system unable to catch absurd applications”); Press Release:  Bikram Obtains Copyright Registration 
for His Asana Sequence, BIKRAM YOGA (July 30, 2003), 
http://www.bikramyoga.com/press/press19.htm (outlining protections obtained and legal victory against 
infringer); William Patry, Yoga and Copyright, PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOG (Aug. 22, 2005), 
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/08/yoga-and-copyright.html (describing Bikram’s claims to 
protection in his yoga sequences as “baloney”). 
 100. See Magliocca, supra note 14, at 876–77, 891 n.64 (discussing sportsmanship norms and 
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created the moves.  If a move is distinctive enough, copying by others will bring 
notoriety to the originator, and permitting copying satisfies fans who would likely 
lose interest if one athlete, performer or team could hold a monopoly on a key 
aspect of the sport.101 
Other, less commented on areas in which IP forbearance is common include 
briefs and other legal documents; hairstyles, which, much like tattoos, are likely 
subject to copyright protection but have seldom if ever been the subject of 
ownership disputes; and fireworks displays, which are amenable to copyright 
protection but see only rare spats over ownership.102 
3.  Use-Based Carve Outs 
In a number of instances, Congress and the courts have explicitly exempted 
certain otherwise infringing activities from liability or suit.  For example, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107, which defines fair use in copyright, creates a whole class of activities that 
would infringe copyright, but do not by operation of the statute.103  These include, 
for example, reprinting materials for purposes of comment, criticism or news 
reporting; copying materials for classroom use; or excerpting materials for 
scholarly use.104  By the same token, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) and the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Madey v. Duke University outline two 
very narrow “experimental use” exceptions to patent infringement, which permit 
certain kinds of otherwise infringing drug development activities and activities by 
people who are motivated purely by curiosity.105  Trademark’s fair use doctrine, 15 
U.S.C. § 1115, permits someone to use a descriptive mark in a descriptive manner, 
even if that use would be likely to create otherwise impermissible consumer 
confusion.106  Other doctrinal carve outs do not render certain activities 
 
contractual limits imposed on athletes by sports leagues); see also Kieff et al., supra note 14, at 774–76 
(same). 
 101. Magliocca, supra note 14, at 876–77; see also Dreyfuss, Business Method Patents, supra note 
96, at 276. 
 102. See Shubha Ghosh, Copyright as Privatization:  The Case of Model Codes, 78 TUL. L. REV. 
653, 721 (2004) (discussing copyrightability of legal complaints and legal briefs); Lydia Pallas Loren, 
The Pope’s Copyright?  Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using Creative Motivation to Shape 
Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (2008) (discussing model legal codes, portrait 
photography, advertisements, all of which are not motivated by protection that copyright affords); 
Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1772, 1774 (discussing the copying of celebrity 
hairstyles, magic tricks and fireworks displays). 
 103. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (describing experimental use 
exception when solely “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry”). 
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 1115; KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 
121–22 (2004).  The Court writes: 
[S]ome possibility of consumer confusion must be compatible with fair use . . . . The common 
law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the part of consumers followed from the very 
fact that in cases like this one an originally descriptive term was selected to be used as a mark, 
not to mention the undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a 
descriptive term simply by grabbing it first. 
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noninfringing, but severely curtail the remedies associated with infringement.  For 
example, 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) eliminates the right of civil action, and the availability 
of an injunction or damages as remedies against a medical practitioner who 
performs a patented medical or surgical activity.107 
The full effects of these carve outs are beyond the scope of this Article.  For this 
Article’s purposes, the carve outs are worth noting because they give users the 
ability to create negative spaces.  This does not happen automatically for every fair 
or experimental use—although, in a sense, every time a user takes advantage of one 
of these carve outs to copy a work, use a trademark or practice a patent, the user 
reduces the exclusivity benefit for the intellectual property owner.  Rather, users 
can create low-IP spaces when their collective use of carve outs moves a type of 
work or invention out of the zone of intellectual property protection. 
More research is required to know whether, and to what extent, use-based 
negative spaces actually arise.  There are two areas, however, where one can safely 
project the emergence of such negative spaces: scholarly writing and medical 
techniques.  In both of these areas, a significant (and possibly predominant) 
proportion of uses would infringe, but are exempted by law.108  As a result, creators 
of such works and inventions know that intellectual property law provides few 
opportunities for exclusivity based benefit.  Yet they continue to create, and the 
carve outs provide the additional opportunity for their users to create by building on 
the original works and inventions. 
Indeed, it is reasonable to believe that use-based carve outs could create 
negative spaces.  Although both of the above carve outs can be traced to the 
promotion of a public interest—free speech and public health, respectively—their 
very existence is premised on the philosophy that they enhance, rather than detract 
from, creation and innovation.  They presume that intellectual property protection 
not only encourages creation through incentives, but could also stifle creation by 
limiting access to the raw materials of creation, i.e., the works that came before.  
Each carve out depends on the assumption that certain restrictions on IP protection 
will not significantly damage the potential for future innovation.  If Congress 
believed, for example, that surgeons would stop innovating if they could not 
receive patent damages for their innovations, Congress could not have, in good 
conscience, enacted the carve out.  Put differently, Congress and the courts have 
concluded that the incremental increase in incentive from protecting these areas 
would come at too steep a price to the public good and to further creation. 
Is Congress’s faith in continued creation warranted?  It appears so.  There is no 
shortage of scholarly writings or medical techniques.  Nor, in the broader sense, is 
there a shortage of copyrighted works, descriptive trademarks and patented 
inventions, despite the existence of fair use and experimental use carve outs.  Of 
course, enacting the carve outs was an uncontrolled experiment, so we can never be 
 
Id. 
 107. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). 
 108. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (categorizing many scholarly uses of copyrighted material as fair use); 35 
U.S.C. § 287(c) (exempting infringement of medical technique patents from liability). 
ROSENBLATT Corrections .docx 5/13/2011  3:47 PM 
336 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:3 
sure whether they have blunted creation.  There is a slim possibility that scholars 
write fewer journal articles because they will not be remunerated when those works 
are reproduced by other academics, or that doctors devise fewer new medical 
techniques because they cannot extract license fees from other doctors who practice 
them.  But assuredly, despite these carve outs, innovation and creation continue to 
flourish.  Indeed, the weight of scholarship argues that expanding doctrines such as 
fair use in copyright and patent’s experimental use exception would promote 
creation and invention.109 
II.  WHAT MAKES A TYPE OF WORK WELL SUITED TO IP’S 
NEGATIVE SPACE? 
Having completed the first step of examining what creates low-IP environments, 
we now turn to the question of what might make something thrive in one.  
Although there has been a great deal of scholarly discussion about various negative 
space environments, relatively little effort has been made to tie these areas to each 
other in anything but name.  Is each area unique?  With the exception of the 
doctrinal carve outs, each area of negative space grew more or less organically 
from the law, norms and business realities of each industry.  But it is not enough to 
say that each area is idiosyncratic, since each must have traits that make it 
conducive to the growth of negative space.  What are these traits? 
The easiest and broadest answer is that in every area of negative space, creators 
are not primarily motivated by the prospect of IP protection.  Although copying 
may deprive individual creators of licensing income, they persist in creating 
without the reward of legally enforced exclusivity.  Indeed, not only do creators in 
negative space operate without the assurance of traditional protection, but also they 
see themselves as benefitting in some way from the lack.  This is not to say that in 
every case, the lack of protection has maximized creation.  Even in negative space 
industries, increased protection might lead to increased creation.  Nor does it 
necessarily mean that the lack of protection has uniformly led to an optimal level of 
creation.110  Nonetheless, vibrant creation in each area—particularly those 
influenced by IP forbearance—implies that legally enforcing exclusivity would 
impose a cost on creators that would exceed the benefit of exclusivity to those 
creators. 
 
 109. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107–10 
(1990) (arguing that the goal of copyright is the utilitarian furtherance of creation and that exceptions to 
absolute rights, such as fair use, also promote this goal); Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent 
Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability:  Implications for 
University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 921 (2004) (“Most 
innovation necessarily builds on that which came before.  Unrestricted use of the earlier innovation for 
experimental purposes can only enhance the process of creating new and improved inventions.”).  See 
generally, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?  Experimental Use and the Patent 
Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004) (arguing that a well designed experimental use exception would 
promote invention). 
 110. See Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?, supra note 79, at 1460–62 (discussing the potential 
differences between maximal creation and optimal creation). 
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However universal, this answer is largely tautological: it posits, in essence, that 
negative space industries benefit in some way from the absence of IP protection 
(i.e., thrive without IP protection).  In addition, the answer begins to break down as 
we attempt to parse exactly what the benefit is.  In some cases, like fashion, the 
advantage may be perpetuation of the fashion cycle.  In others, like academic 
research or open source software, it may be free access to the raw materials of 
creation and a product improved by the input of multiple creators.111  This answer 
is unsatisfying as we attempt to distinguish what makes an industry well matched to 
the low-IP environment.  We need to dig deeper. 
A.  SOME HELPFUL NON-ANSWERS 
A number of the case studies on negative space have identified the traits or 
idiosyncrasies responsible for creating and/or perpetuating low-IP equilibria in the 
industries discussed.112  These are helpful in explaining what keeps many negative 
spaces “negative” rather than devolving (or evolving) into high-IP environments, 
but they do not provide a unified theory of what makes a type of work well suited 
to negative space. 
1.  The Fashion Cycle 
Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman attribute the low-IP equilibrium in the 
fashion industry to the fashion cycle.  Specifically, they argue that the fashion 
industry benefits from copying through the joint operation of what they refer to as 
“anchoring” and “induced obsolescence.”  According to their theory, fashion 
copying is instrumental in creating trends (anchoring) and saturating a market with 
similar goods until they become unstylish (induced obsolescence), thereby driving 
consumers’ need for new, emerging styles which will, in turn, be copied and 
become unstylish.113 
For the fashion industry, Raustiala and Sprigman’s proposition makes a great 
deal of sense.  Many have attempted to argue in recent years that fashion designs 
should receive greater protection, but they proceed largely from an assumption that 
unremunerated copying is harmful.114  Although this may be true for individual 
creators, the fashion cycle appears to offset that harm on an industry wide scale.115  
There seems little doubt that the fashion cycle blunts at least some of the ill effect 
that might arise as a result of fashion’s location in doctrinal no man’s land. 
Why, then, does the fashion cycle alone not provide a unified theory of negative 
space?  The fashion cycle cannot take sole credit for every negative space 
 
 111. See Benkler, supra note 13, at 414; Strandburg, supra note 16, at 103. 
 112. See supra notes 8–19. 
 113. Id. at 1718–34. 
 114. See generally, e.g., Beltrametti, supra note 46; Hemphill & Suk, supra note 39. 
 115. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Revisited, supra note 8, at 1209 (“Fashion piracy may be parasitic 
on original designs, but it is a parasite that does not kill its host:  though it may weaken individual 
designers it also, paradoxically, strengthens the industry and drives its evolution.”). 
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industry—but neither can many of the “commonalities” discussed below.116  In 
logic terms, no single factor discussed below is necessary for the creation of 
negative space.  More importantly, the fashion cycle is also not sufficient for 
suitability to negative space.  Not every industry with a fashion cycle is, nor 
necessarily should be, a negative space industry.  Raustiala and Sprigman argue 
that the fashion cycle drives fashion because clothing and accessories are positional 
goods—but in some ways, the objective of trademark law is to permit anything to 
be a positional good.117  In a variety of contexts (cars, cell phones), the 
fashionability of marks drives consumers’ purchases independent of underlying 
product quality.118  Yet we do not see low-IP equilibria emerging in these 
industries.  In addition, both anchoring and induced obsolescence are present in 
other industries that depend heavily on IP protection—or at least profess to—like 
the popular music industry and studio television industry.  In both industries, output 
tends to conform to trends—see, for example, the rise and fall of “grunge rock” in 
the wake of Nirvana and the profusion of supernatural dramas that followed in the 
footsteps of “Lost”—and the fashion cycle drives popularity.119  At some point, boy 
bands became passé and grunge rock became hackneyed, but the quality of product 
didn’t change, only the degree of market saturation. 
Thus, while some negative space industries are subject to the fashion cycle, it is 
helpful to consider whether there are other, more universal traits that may also 
perpetuate the existence of negative space in fashion. 
2.  Norms 
It has long been recognized that norms play a significant role in governance, 
often stepping into the shoes of positive law where none exists.  In the early 1990s, 
Elinor Ostrom and Robert Ellickson each described the use of social norms, 
common property regimes and cooperative institutions in governing fisheries, 
grazing pastures, irrigation systems and livestock ranches.120  By the same token, 
norms regulate many of IP’s negative spaces.  These norms may make it possible 
for creators to function without intellectual property protection, or encourage 
 
 116. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Fragile Equilibria, VA. L. REV. BRIEF (Jan. 22, 2007), 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2007/01/22/dreyfuss [hereinafter Dreyfuss, 
Fragile Equilibria] (pointing out that the fashion cycle is not universally applicable to low-IP 
industries).  It should be noted that, as a matter of causality, Raustiala and Sprigman do not contend that 
the fashion cycle “caused” intellectual property law to be weak in the fashion industry.  Rather, they 
argue that, by virtue of the fashion cycle, the fashion industry has benefited from the existence of a low-
IP environment.  Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1733. 
 117. See generally Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 809, 848–59 (2010) (arguing that trademark law has failed in its antidilution objectives); 
Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1776. 
 118. Beebe, supra note 117, at 831, 837–38 (describing the decoupling of trademark elitism and 
product quality). 
 119. Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1776. 
 120. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:  THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle:  Dispute 
Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986). 
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creators to opt out of intellectual property ownership or enforcement, or both.  
Some mimic intellectual property, like the trademark-style norms of roller derby; 
others surpass the restrictions of traditional intellectual property, like the norms of 
stand-up comedy, which discourage copying of ideas as well as expressions.121  
Some encourage sharing and collaboration, like the conventions of the open source 
community; others focus on attribution, like those governing the creative commons 
and academic science communities.122  Still others discourage creators from 
pursuing infringers, like the “culture of hospitality” in the realm of creative cuisine 
or the culture of sportsmanship.123 
In one sense, therefore, whether an industry is amenable to governance by norms 
is relevant to whether it is well suited to occupy IP’s negative space.  If an industry 
is capable of internal regulation through norms, it has less need for intellectual 
property protection, and norms can facilitate the creation of negative space through 
IP forbearance.  Certainly, the breakdown of IP forbearance norms is associated 
with an industry’s departure from IP’s negative space.124  But in another sense, 
norms are neither necessary nor sufficient for the creation of negative space.  A 
negative space can arise without governing norms, if independent creators are 
sufficiently interested in creating without intellectual property protection.  Indeed, a 
significant portion of the fashion industry—in many ways the quintessential 
negative space—is not governed by norms.  Low-end copyists do not consider 
themselves to be part of the “high fashion” community, and thus do not consider 
themselves to be ruled by the fashion industry’s norms, and yet their activities have 
a significant role in perpetuating fashion’s negative space through the fashion 
 
 121. See Fagundes, supra note 19 (explaining norms to protect derby names); Oliar & Sprigman, 
supra note 11, at 1812 (discussing norms in stand-up comedy). 
 122. See Benkler, supra note 13, at 431–44; Strandburg, supra note 16, at 114–15; Creative 
Commons Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/ (last visited Feb. 
5, 2011). 
 123. Buccafusco, supra note 9, at 1151 (describing a “culture of hospitality” that would lead to 
forbearance even if intellectual property protection were available); Kieff et al., supra note 14, at 774–
76 (describing cultural forces that discourage patenting sports movies); Magliocca, supra note 14, at 
876–77 (same). 
 124. Dreyfuss, Fragile Equilibria, supra note 116.  Academic scientists’ culture of sharing has 
eroded since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act made protection profitable for academic inventors; 
financial analysts have begun seeking patent protection for tax (and other) strategies since the law has 
become friendlier to business method patents; and roller derby participants have begun registering their 
pseudonyms as trademarks.  Fagundes, supra note 19, at 22 (noting that at least one roller derby league 
has begun registering pseudonyms as trademarks); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research:  
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 119 (1999) (documenting 
partial breakdown of sharing norms following passage of Bayh-Dole Act).  In each of these areas, 
renegades have determined that increased IP protection would be beneficial, and others have followed 
suit.  Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss has identified a number of changed circumstances likely to contribute to 
the breakdown of low-IP equilibria in IP forbearance communities:  an increase in a product’s 
profitability may lead to “bounded altruism” on the part of putative IP holders; one renegade may break 
the dam of protection or litigation, leading to “tipping” and “herding” by others who do not want to miss 
out on potential profit; “failed leadership” may lead to the breakdown of beneficial norms; and 
“technological change” such as easier copying may make it more beneficial to extract value from 
protection or litigation than from less formal forms of protection.  Dreyfuss, Fragile Equilibria, supra 
note 116. 
ROSENBLATT Corrections .docx 5/13/2011  3:47 PM 
340 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:3 
cycle.125  Conversely, not every industry capable of being governed by norms is 
necessarily well suited to IP’s negative space.  If that were true, we might expect 
that boat hull shapes and tax shelter innovations would have remained in IP’s 
negative space—and we might expect to see negative space overtake the entire 
software, feature film and music industries, rather than merely the open source and 
creative commons portions of them. 
Norms and customs must arise from somewhere.  They do not spring from the 
void; rather, they exist to enforce a state of affairs that is favorable for a critical 
mass of the community to which they apply.126  Thus, while norms help to explain 
how negative space systems operate and how they can continue to exist even in the 
face of harm to individual creators, we cannot give norms credit, or blame, for 
making a particular type of work well suited to low-IP treatment.  Rather, norms 
step in to fill the void when intellectual property protection is, for some reason, 
unavailable or undesirable. 
B.  IDENTIFYING COMMONALITIES 
Perhaps the chief benefit of having created the taxonomy above is that it helps to 
identify who is responsible for creating negative space.  Specifically, it tells us that 
negative space is created by lawmakers and creators: when an area of negative 
space falls into doctrinal no man’s land, it has been placed there by lawmakers.  
When an area of negative space falls into a zone of IP forbearance, it has been 
placed there by creators.  And—to break the pattern—when an area of negative 
space falls into a use-based carve out, it has been placed there both by the 
lawmakers who made the carve out, and the creators who prefer creation, even 
when protection is uncertain.  To determine what negative space works have in 
common, we can ask, why would these constituencies prefer nonprotection to 
protection? 
As a general matter, every type of work that resides in negative space is one for 
which, for lawmakers or creators, exclusivity is “not worth it.”  In doctrinal no 
man’s land, this means that legislators or courts have determined that the potential 
increase in productivity that might result from protectability is outweighed by the 
value of free access to a given type of invention or creation.  In IP forbearance 
 
 125. See Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 198 (noting that mass merchandisers are not 
governed by the norms systems of the high fashion industry). 
 126. There is vibrant scholarly debate on the origin of norms, but scholars tend to agree that they 
arise through some alchemical combination of rational and societal factors.  See, e.g., ROBERT 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 167 (1991) (“[M]embers of a 
close-knit group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare 
that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another.”); Dennis Chong, Values Versus 
Interests in the Explanation of Social Conflict, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2079, 2101 (1996) (“No individual 
has the resources to evaluate thoroughly all of the choices he must make, so by conforming to the status 
quo he takes advantage of the cumulative wisdom of the community.  In effect, he operates on the 
assumption that existing practices have survived the trial-and-error test.”); Amitai Etzioni, Social 
Norms:  Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 157, 171–75 (2000) (reviewing 
scholarship on norms formation). 
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systems, this means that creators believe the expense of seeking protection or 
enforcement would outweigh the benefit that would result, or that the value of free 
access to others’ creations would exceed the value of exclusivity in one’s own. 
As a result, the boundaries of negative space are seldom entirely contiguous 
with industry boundaries.  Lawmakers have created doctrinal no man’s land and 
facilitated the creation of use-based carve outs not through laws designed to 
exclude certain industries from protection, but rather through the application of 
generalized bases for nonprotection that, coincidentally, exempt certain types of 
works from protection.127  For example, fashion designs most often fall between the 
cracks of IP protection because Congress has determined that copyright law should 
not protect functional items, trademark law should protect only product 
configurations whose nonfunctional features serve a source identifying function 
and design patents should require examination and filing formalities.128  But quite a 
few fashion designs are protected under trademark and design patent law, and 
many have been the subject of IP litigation.129  Likewise, the boundaries of IP 
forbearance are also not contiguous with industry boundaries.  For example, 
although the open source movement is a powerful force in software development, 
there are still many large and small scale software developers who seek copyright 
and patent infringement, and pursue infringers.130  Thus, in analyzing what makes a 
type of creation well suited to either doctrinal no man’s land or an IP forbearance 
environment, we need to look not to the traits of any given industry or industries, 
but to the more generalized circumstances that would lead lawmakers and creators 
to believe that the benefits of reduced intellectual property protection outweigh the 
drawbacks. 
The boundaries of IP doctrine are drawn by lawmakers, ostensibly in the public 
interest.  These boundaries govern what falls into doctrinal no man’s land, and what 
becomes negative space through use-based carve out.  As a result, both doctrinal no 
man’s land and use-based carve outs should arise when lawmakers conclude that 
the public would benefit more from reduced protection than it would from 
exclusivity.  This will occur in three overlapping situations: (1) when lawmakers 
observe that creation is significantly driven by something other than exclusivity-
based financial gain; (2) when lawmakers believe that granting exclusivity would 
compromise other creation or innovation; and/or (3) when the public interest in free 
access to information is higher than the danger of reduced production from reduced 
incentives. 
Interestingly, these same overlapping considerations—with one addition—are 
instrumental in driving IP forbearance.  A culture of IP forbearance arises when 
 
 127. But see 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006) (excluding patents in the medical procedure industry from 
damages for infringement). 
 128. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1698–1705. 
 129. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) (holding that 
fashion designs may be subject to trademark protection if they obtain secondary meaning as source 
identifiers); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1124–26 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding 
that athletic shoes infringed design patent in L.A. Gear’s “Hot Shots” design). 
 130. See Magliocca, supra note 14, at 901. 
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influential creators (or intellectual property owners or controllers) would benefit 
more from leaving their works vulnerable to copying than they would from seeking 
license fees.  Specifically, this occurs (1) when creation is significantly driven by 
something other than exclusivity based financial gain; (2) when creators rely on the 
works or inventions of others to create their own products; (3) when creators’ 
interest in free access to their creations is higher than their interest in exclusivity; 
and/or (4) when creators prefer to reinvest scarce resources in further creation than 
in protection or enforcement of intellectual property.  This latter condition is most 
likely to occur when the financial or personal cost of obtaining protection or 
pursuing infringers exceeds the benefit of exclusivity or damages under current 
intellectual property law. 
Combining these, we can settle on four overlapping sets of conditions that are 
likely to make a work well suited to low-IP treatment under current law—four sets 
of conditions likely to create negative space.  These are (1) when creation is driven 
by rewards not reliant on exclusivity; (2) when exclusivity would harm further 
creation; (3) when there is high public or creator interest in free access without 
harm to creativity; and (4) when creators prefer to reinvest scarce resources in 
further creation than in protection or enforcement of intellectual property, i.e., 
when there is a higher cost of protecting or enforcing exclusivity than benefit to 
pursuing infringers.  I posit that any existing negative space industry or creative 
community experiences at least one of these conditions, and that any industry or 
creative community that consistently experiences any of these conditions is better 
suited to low-IP treatment than an industry or creative community that does not.  
Thus, a proclivity for negative space treatment is not necessarily inherent in a 
particular industry or creative community: although some of these factors depend 
on extra-legal factors such as community culture, most hinge on traits of current 
intellectual property law.  If the law changes, negative spaces may change.  If the 
law provided for rewards other than exclusivity, for example, or reduced the cost of 
protection, certain industries or creative communities might be less likely to shun 
protection. 
1.  Creation Driven by Rewards Not Tied to Exclusivity 
Some creators and inventors are motivated primarily by financial concerns.  
Others are motivated by a desire to create, to do something; still others are 
motivated by a practical need for new and improved technologies.  The reasons are 
endless. 
The chief financial benefit of exclusivity is that one can charge more for a 
product.  The laws of supply and demand dictate that one with exclusive rights over 
a product can demand a higher price, and may be able to build and capitalize on a 
licensing market for rights to copy a work or use an invention.  For this reason, 
exclusivity is of little value to creators whose motivations do not include financial 
gain. This does not mean, however, that such creators desire no compensation or 
benefit from their creations—only that financial gain is not the primary 
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compensation or benefit that they seek.131  Rather, they may prefer to receive 
recognition or become a part of a community.  But even for those motivated by 
material gain, exclusivity may not be the most lucrative or desirable option.  This is 
because, to put it in economic terms, scarcity alone does not necessarily create 
value.  Value may be created or enhanced through name recognition, network 
effects or other first mover advantages that are more likely to be undermined by 
exclusivity than enhanced by it.  These things drive the denizens of doctrinal no 
man’s land to create without the promise of exclusivity, and drive others to forego 
available intellectual property protection. 
a.  The Value of Recognition 
For some creators, like those in nonprofit activities such as blogging, 
contributing to wikis and creating fanworks, recognition alone is a significant 
incentive to create.132  For others, recognition is a means to a financially beneficial 
end:  the better known one’s works are, the more money one can make from them 
even when they are copied (as in fashion), the more money one can make from 
subsequent protected works (as in the early stage of a pop or hip hop musician’s 
career) or (as in academia and computer programming) the more money one can 
make from other sources, such as employment.133  Although individual motivations 
may vary, the recent proliferation of various attribution focused licenses, including 
creative commons, science commons and GPL/GNU, emphasizes that in many 
circumstances, creators would prefer attention to money.134 
Exclusivity raises the cost of access to works.  As a result, exclusivity is less 
 
 131. There are, of course, those who need no incentive whatsoever to create or innovate, for 
example, those who create for the sheer joy of creation and care not whether their creations reach an 
audience.  Although the availability of intellectual property protection for their works is not a necessary 
motivator for such creators, it is also unlikely to serve as a disincentive for them.  For this reason, their 
own creations may not, themselves, fall into negative space as defined—they will not benefit (or be 
harmed by) a lack of traditional intellectual property law.  They will, however, benefit from the 
existence of negative space even more than other creators.  Since they do not profit from their works, 
such “sheer joy” creators are particularly susceptible to IP’s tendency to increase the (licensing) cost of 
creative raw materials and thereby to constrict the creator’s available creative capital. 
 132. See Garon, supra note 15, at 101 (discussing attribution on wikis); Rebecca Tushnet, Payment 
in Credit:  Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 156–60 (2007) 
[hereinafter Tushnet, Payment in Credit] (“[F]ans need to credit—or, depending on the degree to which 
they distinguish intrafan morality from external morality, to get permission to use—other fans' work, 
whereas they feel free to mine the outside world for raw material, as long as the resulting works stay 
noncommercial.”).  But cf., Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire:  Fair Use and Marketplace 
Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009) (characterizing many fanwork creators as motivated 
primarily by a desire to create). 
 133. See Anderson, supra note 18, at 140–53 (discussing the importance of the mixtape in 
promoting musicians); Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1215–16 (discussing the 
importance of powerful brands in fashion); Tushnet, Payment in Credit, supra note 132, at 158 
(“Historians, who generally rely on reputation more than money as compensation for their contributions 
to the sum of knowledge, care more about proper attribution within the profession than outside it.”). 
 134. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 85, at 53–57; Garon, supra note 15, at 115–16.  See generally CLAY 
SHIRKY, COGNITIVE SURPLUS:  CREATIVITY AND GENEROSITY IN A CONNECTED AGE (2010) (discussing 
the attention economy and its products). 
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desirable to those who favor recognition, because they would prefer greater 
dissemination of their works—with attribution.  For the most part, however, 
traditional intellectual property cannot promise attribution.  It is a notorious truism 
that plagiarism (i.e., taking someone’s idea without giving credit) is not a form of 
copyright infringement.135  The remedies for copyright and patent infringement are 
royalties or injunctions—not credit.136  And the most common remedy for 
trademark infringement is an injunction against using the mark, not attribution of 
the mark to the mark holder.137  Indeed, because omitting attribution may make 
infringements more difficult to find, and because copyright’s fair use provisions do 
not consider attribution in assessing whether a particular use is fair, infringers may 
be more likely to copy protected works without attribution than with attribution.138 
In a society in which “cognitive surplus” often creates a much greater supply of 
works than demand for them, many creators would prefer to be noticed than to be 
paid.139  Consider, for example, the citizen journalist:  with a blog alone, she could 
be shouting into the wind; if a major aggregator copies her work with attribution, 
on the other hand, she gains readers and the possibility of income, for example 
through employment or through advertisements on the blog.  Similar situations 
exist for hip hop DJs, who distribute mixtapes and unprotectable derivative works 
with the hope and understanding that they will be copied; popular musicians 
seeking to break into the industry, who distribute their music and videos on sites 
such as MySpace and YouTube hoping that they will be copied and distributed 
virally; and aspiring television creators, who submit unprotectable ideas to 
developers and producers in the hope of breaking into the industry, despite the 
 
 135. See generally Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Plagiarism:  Legal and Ethical Implications for 
the University, 37 J.C. & U.L. 1 (2010) (discussing legal and ethical differences between plagiarism and 
infringement).  See also Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1823 (discussing difference between 
plagiarism and infringement). 
 136. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–05 (2006) (covering copyright remedies); 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–84 (2006) 
(providing patent remedies). 
 137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116–17 (2006) (providing trademark remedies); see Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. 
Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 1247 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n injunction is the preferred Lanham 
Act remedy . . . .”). 
 138. See Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution:  Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 
41, 88 (2007) (cataloging instances in which courts have considered attribution as an equitable 
consideration in assessing fair use, noting lack of explicit inclusion of attribution as a fair use factor, and 
proposing that fair use analysis include formal consideration of attribution). 
 139. See generally SHIRKY, supra note 134, at 65–95.  See also CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES 
EVERYBODY:  THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS 132 (2008) (stating that people 
contribute to Wikipedia and other noncommercial projects for “a chance to exercise some unused mental 
capacities” and out of “vanity—the ‘Kilroy was here’ pleasure of changing something in the world, just 
to see my imprint on it.  Making a mark on the world is a common human desire.”).  In many 
circumstances, as discussed below, a side effect of cognitive surplus on creators is a desire for 
attribution:  they wish not only for their works to be widely distributed, but also for their works to be 
recognized as their own.  It should be noted, however, that this is not the universal response.  Some 
creators are happy for their works to be used without any sort of attribution, and are satisfied with the 
sense of personal pride that comes from knowing other people are exposed to the work.  Still others—for 
example, those who pen religious texts—may have a powerful desire for their works to be disseminated, 
even anonymously, for reasons entirely unrelated to personal achievement. 
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possibility that such ideas, if good, may be copied without compensation.140  In 
academia, where prestige counts, one hopes to have one’s work copied, 
disseminated and quoted with attribution.  If recognition is a creator’s objective, the 
creator may do better outside the intellectual property system, particularly if the 
alternative is an environment in which copying is common and there are norms 
requiring attribution.  This may lead them to engage in IP forbearance in 
conjunction with promoting attribution norms, either through a formal system such 
as creative commons or open source software, or informally, through the creation 
of attribution norms such as those surrounding wikis, fanworks, cuisine and hip hop 
mixtapes.141 
Of course, these examples are but a few of many.  The desire for recognition can 
be a powerful motivator for creators of any type.  (If this were not true, there would 
be many fewer “starving artists.”)  This means that recognition-driven negative 
space is not necessarily an industry-wide concept.  Within any industry, creators 
will vary in their desire for recognition, the degree to which they perceive 
intellectual property protection as a bar to recognition, and the degree to which they 
are willing and able to rely on attribution-based norms.  Thus, works within the 
same industry may vary in their fitness for negative space treatment. 
b.  Community Building 
Just as some people create out of a desire for recognition, some create out of a 
desire for community.  Fanwork and transformative culture, the open source 
movement, wiki creation and contribution and roller derby, to name a few, are 
subcultures built around the creation of potentially protectable, but generally 
unprotected, works.142  These communities share an ethos of independence and 
even mild transgression:  “We are bucking the establishment.”  One joins such a 
 
 140. See Anderson, supra note 18, at 138–44 (describing DJs who intentionally distribute 
mixtapes); Symposium, supra note 94, at 1298 (noting that DJ Danger Mouse, producer of the “Gray 
Album,” benefited from creating it through industry recognition and opportunities to produce profitable 
musical projects, notwithstanding that the “Gray Album” was not eligible for copyright protection); 
Weisselberg, supra note 63, at 186–90 (discussing the lack of protection for TV show ideas).  In 
addition, pop musician Lily Allen rose to fame by distributing her music virally on sites such as 
MySpace.  Once she became an established recording artist, she developed a greater interest in 
intellectual property protection.  See Tama Leaver, Learning with Lily Allen:   Copyright Criminals or 
Complexity and Confusion?, FLOWTV (Oct. 30, 2009), http://flowtv.org/2009/10/learning-with-lily-
allen-copyright-criminals-or-complexity-and-confusion-tama-leaver-curtin-university-of-technology/. 
 141. See, e.g., Buccafusco, supra note 9, at 1151–52 (discussing culture of credit in haute cuisine); 
Garon, supra note 15, at 107–08 (discussing culture of credit in wikis). 
 142. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions:  Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common 
Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 657 (1997).  Tushnet quotes a fan describing the value of fan 
fiction: 
The ethos of [fan fiction] is one of community, of shared journeys to understanding and 
enjoyment.  Regardless of literary value, fan fiction is a pleasurable and valuable part of many 
fans' experiences.  The political importance of fandom stems from sharing secondary creations.  
Fans feel that they are making significant life choices when they share their work with a broader 
community of like-minded people. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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community by creating works—stories, computer programs, information 
compilations or pseudonyms—and communicating them to other members of the 
community.  Implicit is the assumption that the creator will not break stride with 
the norms of the community.  Pursuit of traditional intellectual property, or pursuit 
of infringers, is grounds for social expulsion. 
It appears that these communities engage in Ellicksonian rule creation either as a 
manifestation of independence or of a desire for rules that vary from traditional 
intellectual property, or both.  For some, community rules resemble traditional 
intellectual property law.  For example, when roller derby participants assess who 
is entitled to keep a particular pseudonym, they rely on an internally created rule set 
that looks remarkably like the AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats factors for adjudicating 
trademark infringement.143  This could suggest that the Sleekcraft factors are 
instances of instinctive natural law, but it is more likely that the factors were used 
as a model for the roller derby system.  Thus, it is not that the derby participants 
desired a different set of rules, but that they desired different arbiters of them—i.e., 
themselves.  The subculture of pseudonyms in roller derby is culturally inconsistent 
with the idea of arbitration by a third party, and the roller derby participants have 
situated themselves in IP’s negative space to maintain their sense of community. 
Others, such as the fan fiction, open source, wiki and athletics communities, 
enforce internal norms that differ from traditional IP, presumably because such 
norms are better suited to serving the priorities of the creators.  The fanwork, wiki 
and open source norms permit and even encourage copying, but generally insist on 
attribution and noncommerciality.144  Along the same lines, athletes generally 
decline protection for innovative sports moves, although they could seek it, at least 
in theory.145  As a cultural matter, they rely on sportsmanship and the idea of a 
“level playing field” in which no competitor has an unfair advantage.146  That these 
communities both elect and self-enforce norms outside the mold of traditional 
intellectual property law implies that, at least in part, they situate themselves in IP’s 
negative space as a form of community building, rather than the other way around. 
c.  First Mover Advantages and Network Effects 
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have suggested that first mover advantages and 
 
 143. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–50 (9th Cir. 1979) (articulating the Ninth 
Circuit’s test for “likelihood of confusion” between similar trademarks); see also Fagundes, supra note 
19 (discussing why roller derby participants prefer internal norms). 
 144. See Casey Fiesler, Everything I Need to Know I Learned from Fandom:  How Existing Social 
Norms Can Help Shape the Next Generation of User-Generated Content, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
729, 749–54 (describing internal enforcement, noncommerciality and attribution norms in fanfiction 
community); Garon, supra note 15, at 101 (describing idiosyncratic attribution norms in wiki 
communities); Glenn O. Brown, Announcing (and Explaining) Our New 2.0 Licenses, CREATIVE 
COMMONS (May 25, 2004), http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/4216 (explaining that attribution 
would become a standard feature of Creative Commons licenses because ninety-seven to ninety-eight 
percent of Creative Commons users opted for attribution when selecting licenses). 
 145. See Kieff et al., supra note 14, at 768–81. 
 146. See id. 
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network effects explain how originators continue to thrive in the absence of strong 
intellectual property rules or effective enforcement mechanisms.147  A first mover 
advantage exists when a creator or innovator can create enough revenue from the 
introduction of its product that it is not effectively harmed by later copyists.148  
First mover advantages are likely to arise when development of a product or idea is 
relatively inexpensive but copying is relatively expensive or slow; when the 
reputational advantage of being first outweighs the potential for lost sales such that 
consumers will continue to purchase an original even after imitations are available; 
when an industry is small enough that it can only support one source; or when a 
product will become obsolete before it can be copied.149 
First mover advantages have perpetuated innovation in doctrinal no man’s 
land.150  For example, new entrants into the electronic database industry benefit 
from a first mover advantage.151  In addition, although Raustiala and Sprigman 
have resisted such a categorization, the fashion cycle itself embodies a powerful set 
of first mover advantages.152  “Anchoring,” the idea that a particular style becomes 
a trend when copied, embodies a first mover advantage for style originators.153  
Meanwhile, “induced obsolescence,” the idea that once a design is copied enough, 
the market will demand it be replaced by another design, represents a steady stream 
of opportunities for designers to become “first movers.”154 
Indeed, first mover advantages likely come into play for many positional goods, 
where there is value to being the “genuine” article.  This effect may be responsible, 
for example, for continued creation of perfumes despite producers’ inability to 
protect scents.  Copyists may legally reverse engineer an aroma, but then must 
either build a new brand to go with it or label themselves as “designer 
impostors.”155  Designer impostors may capture some of a perfumer’s business, but 
may also draw even more attention to the original perfumer’s brand.  The result is 
that copyists are unlikely to have a significant negative impact on the originator, 
and creation continues despite weak protection. 
 
 147. Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1584–86. 
 148. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All:  A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual 
Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1414–15 [hereinafter Caroll, One Size] (defining and describing 
benefits of first mover advantage). 
 149. See id. 
 150. Indeed, Nancy Dorfman has argued that the first mover advantage, not the prospect of patent 
exclusivity, has been the primary reason for innovation in the computer hardware and semiconductor 
industries. NANCY S. DORFMAN, INNOVATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE:  LESSONS FROM THE 
COMPUTER AND SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRIES 235–39 (1987).  This hypothesis is consistent with more 
recent empirical work.  See Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson, & Ted Sichelman, 
High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:  Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1289–90 (2010) (finding that software and Internet startups considered first 
mover advantage to be significantly more important than any other appropriability strategy, including 
patent or copyright protection). 
 151. See Dreyfuss, Fragile Equilibria, supra note 116. 
 152. Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1759–62. 
 153. Id. at 1728–29 (discussing anchoring). 
 154. Id. at 1718–19 (discussing induced obsolescence). 
 155. Id. at 1772–73 (discussing fragrances). 
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Related to the first mover advantage is the “network effect,” which, for some 
goods, rewards the first market entrant to build a customer base.156  The network 
effect functions to increase the value of certain purchased goods or services as a 
result of other consumers’ choice to purchase or use the same good or service.157 
One classic example of a good that benefits from the network effect is the 
telephone, which becomes more valuable to each purchaser—and hence to the 
seller—as more purchasers acquire telephones.158  First mover advantages and 
network effects are likely to arise when development of a product or idea is 
relatively inexpensive but copying is relatively expensive or slow; when the 
reputational or network effect advantage of being first outweighs the potential for 
lost sales such that consumers will continue to purchase an original even after 
imitations are available; when an industry is small enough that it can only support 
one source; or when a product will become obsolete before it can be copied. 
Software is the quintessential example of an industry that benefits from network 
effects, because the value of a software program frequently depends on how many 
people use it.  Adobe, for example, gives away its PDF reader for free: once 
everyone uses it, Adobe’s more expensive PDF encoder becomes very valuable.159  
This suggests that negative space treatment is appropriate for some software—
software that may help to build user standards, for example—but not for all 
software.  And indeed, a partial protection system has arisen organically in the 
software field: a healthy open source movement develops standards, and companies 
seek and assert IP protection for many of the products made using those 
standards.160  IP forbearance provides a benefit for creators, as their products 
spread inexpensively (often virally and at no cost) while consumers will, in turn, 
spend money on related products.  For this reason, IP forbearance will be common 
in industries with significant network effects. 
When there are strong network effects or other first mover advantages, 
intellectual property protection is not only superfluous, but may also hinder 
innovation.  A software creator who wishes his or her product to be distributed 
virally for quick network effects would be ill-served by traditional intellectual 
property protection; a trendsetting first mover in the database or fashion field 
benefits from imitators who draw attention to the authenticity of the “original.” 
2.  Exclusivity Would Harm Further Creation 
Although intellectual property tends to encourage creation in many settings, it 
carries social and creative costs.  The more protection afforded a work, the more 
expensive it becomes for others to use it.  This added expense could come in the 
 
 156. See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1585–86 (citing literature on network 
effects). 
 157. See Carroll, One Size, supra note 148, at 1416 (discussing network effects). 
 158. See id. 
 159. See Daniel F. Spulber, Solving the Circular Conundrum:  Communication and Coordination 
in Internet Markets, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 537, 549–50 (2010). 
 160. See Dreyfuss, Fragile Equilibria, supra note 116. 
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form of litigation or licensing costs, or in the form of risk aversion.  Both can chill 
creation, particularly where protected works or inventions could form the building 
blocks of new creations.161 
For copyrighted works, the fair use doctrine can help alleviate these costs—and 
in many situations, it works, through the creation of negative space.  For example, 
much academic writing resides in IP’s negative space because its principal uses—
classroom use and scholarly analysis and citation—are carved out as fair uses.162  
Such works thrive in negative space both because, as discussed above, their authors 
seek recognition as much as exclusivity, and because their authors know that it 
would become prohibitively expensive to create new works without freely using 
earlier works of the same type. 
One might expect patent law to contain many similar carve outs, since most 
inventions rely on what came before.  In fact, lawmakers have carved out relatively 
few such areas.  The common law experimental use exception, which permits 
activity that would otherwise be infringing if it were done purely to satisfy the 
infringer’s curiosity, is so narrow as to be barely an exception at all.163 
By way of contrast, the doctrinal no man’s land surrounding patent law has 
created a number of negative spaces that thrive because their occupants rely on 
predecessors’ work.  Chefs, for example, continue to innovate without intellectual 
property protection, largely by tweaking and enhancing the recipes of their 
predecessors and colleagues in the art.164  If recipes were commonly subject to 
patent protection, gastronomical innovation would become both expensive and 
risky.  Along the same lines, sports innovation thrives without patent protection 
because athletes know that they benefit more from being able to imitate and build 
upon the work of their skilled colleagues than through legal protection.165  This 
philosophy is shared by sports leagues, many of which prohibit their members from 
seeking IP protection for innovative techniques.166 
We see the same phenomenon in fashion.  It is a rare fashion design that cannot 
be traced to any influences, and many designs could easily qualify as “substantially 
similar” to their forbears.167  Of course, most modern designs also differ from their 
forbears, but if traditional intellectual property law offered stronger protection for 
 
 161. Anecdotal evidence of the chilling effect of high licensing costs abounds.  See, e.g., Loren, 
supra note 102, at 14 (discussing prohibitive cost of copyrighted footage for documentaries); Elizabeth 
L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use in Entertainment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 
1038–40 (2009) (discussing how a perceived need to clear trademarks chills production of entertainment 
products); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1899, 1903, 1914–15 (describing chilling effects of “clearance culture”); Strandburg, supra note 
16, at 108 (discussing how patenting university research could threaten curiosity driven research). 
 162. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (defining limitations on exclusive rights and fair use). 
 163. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that 
experimental use defense is not available for any activities that are “in furtherance of the alleged 
infringer's legitimate business” and available only to activities undertaken “solely for amusement, to 
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry”). 
 164. See Buccafusco, supra note 9, at 1146–50. 
 165. See Kieff et al., supra note 14, at 774–76. 
 166. See Magliocca, supra note 14, at 891 n.64. 
 167. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Revisited, supra note 8, at 1207–08. 
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fashion designs (for example, trademark or copyright style protection to works that 
had not yet acquired secondary meaning), designers would run a constant risk of 
infringing.  Thus, while designers often bemoan the rise of counterfeiting, fashion 
still thrives in a negative space environment.168  The same is true for the typeface 
industry, where easy digital copying has cut profitability, but designers understand 
that some copying is necessary for the creation of new typefaces.169 
3.  High Public or Creator Interest in Free Access without Risk to Incentives 
Laws are designed to serve the public interest.  As a result, when there is a high 
public interest in free (i.e., no cost) access to creations and innovations, lawmakers 
are more likely to leave such creations unprotected by intellectual property law by 
creating doctrinal no man’s land and facilitating use-based carve outs.  For 
example, Congress has determined that there should be no damages for 
infringement of patents covering medical procedures; that descriptive terms should 
not be protectable as copyrights unless they have already acquired secondary 
meaning; and that people should be able to copy for the purpose of criticism, 
commentary or classroom use.170  In each of these situations, public values—public 
health, in the first instance, and free speech in the latter two—trump the potential 
incentive value of protection.  These examples are only the tip of the iceberg.  
Every boundary of intellectual property law, at least in theory, represents a 
compromise between the value of public access to information against the incentive 
of protection.  It is a delicate balance. 
For that reason, a high public value to access is not itself enough to create 
negative space.  Rather, access is a factor likely to weigh in favor of a gap in 
protection.  Lawmakers must then predict whether reduced opportunities for 
exclusivity will lead to reduced creation.  To the extent that such risks seem 
acceptable, gaps in protection are appropriate.  When lawmakers are correct, and 
there remains sufficient motivation to create without exclusivity incentives, 
negative space emerges. 
In addition, in some circumstances, an intellectual property owner may be 
sufficiently interested in free access to his or her works as to forego IP protection.  
This is true of most advertisements, but it is not unique to commercial speech.  For 
example, people who create religious works may be sufficiently interested in 
spreading the word that they want to minimize costs to the consumer.171  The same 
is true of those who intend their works to persuade politically.  The point is to get 
the word out, and it may not matter whether that word is copied, imitated, attributed 
or paid for. 
 
 168. See id. 
 169. See Lipton, supra note 12, at 169. 
 170. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006) (limiting copyrightability of descriptive terms); 17 U.S.C. § 
107 (2006) (describing fair use of copyrighted works); 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006) (excluding patents 
covering medical procedures from damages for infringement). 
 171. Cf. Loren, supra note 102, at 8 (discussing the Catholic Church’s exercise of copyright 
protection in order to offset production costs and generate income). 
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4.  Reinvestment in Creation Preferable to IP Protection or Enforcement 
Finally, negative space may arise when creators prefer to invest in creation 
rather than in protection or enforcement.  This is most likely to occur when creators 
believe that the expense of seeking protection or pursuing infringers exceeds the 
benefit of doing so.172  The costs of intellectual property protection, and the 
benefits to be gained from such protection, vary widely according to the type of 
creation and the type of protection available.  For copyrightable works and 
trademarks, obtaining protection is as easy as fixing a work in a tangible medium of 
expression or using a mark in commerce in connection with the sale of goods or 
services.173  Registration of copyrights and trademarks is more expensive, but has 
various benefits for pursuing infringers.174  Obtaining a patent is even more 
expensive in application costs, time and attorney’s fees.175  There is little to be 
gained from registering one’s copyright or trademark or obtaining a patent unless 
the registration or patent will have value. 
Typically, the value of obtaining a patent or a registration is the right to pursue 
infringers.176  When the cost of pursuing infringers is high, and the relative benefit 
to be recovered is comparatively low, creators are more likely to forbear.  As a 
result, IP owners deciding whether to pursue infringers need to know their chances 
of success, the potential upside gain to winning, and the potential downside loss of 
permitting infringement to continue. 
 
 172. In this Article, I assume that creators are correct in their assumptions about the costs and 
benefits of protection and enforcement.  It is, of course possible that creators’ beliefs differ from reality.  
Creators may presume, for example, that protection and enforcement are more expensive or complex 
than they really are, or that enforcement is less likely to be beneficial than it actually is.  If so, then the 
creation of negative space is more dependent on creators’ perceptions of costs and rewards than on 
actual costs and rewards.  In all other respects, however, the analysis remains the same, as does the 
conclusion that visibly reducing the cost of protection or enforcement could benefit such creators. 
 173. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof . . . used [in commerce] by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods 
. . . from those manufactured or sold by others”); 17 U.S.C. § 102 (defining copyrightable material as 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”). 
 174. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (providing a presumption of nationwide rights with trademark 
registration); 17 U.S.C. § 412 (permitting a recovery of statutory damages against infringers with 
copyright registration). 
 175. See Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs:  An Empirical Study, 
17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 133–34 (2010) (describing “the high costs of patenting” as 
a significant reason that startup companies decide not to obtain patent on new inventions). 
 176. This is not to say that pursuing infringers is the only reason one might seek IP protection.  For 
example, one may seek protection for prestige or personal pride; for the ability to use the patent or 
registration as a form of alternative currency for cross-licensing or other bargaining; or for the ability to 
use the patent as a symbol of value for purposes of raising investment funds.  The existence of these 
reasons highlights the interconnectedness of the four categories of negative space promoting conditions 
discussed herein.  Specifically, one who obtains a patent or registration for one of these reasons, as 
opposed to enforcement, is engaging in a form of IP forbearance, and in the process, may be creating 
negative space.  Such inventors and creators create for a reason other than a desire for exclusivity 
(category one) and engage in IP forbearance because they cannot afford to pursue infringers or because 
they perceive less potential benefit in pursuing infringers than they do in cross-licensing or raising 
money (both examples of category four). 
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In theory, the presence of this factor will only create negative space when the 
cost savings of declining protection and enforcement can be reinvested in a way 
that benefits creation.  In practice, it is difficult to imagine many situations in 
which such reinvestment is not possible or likely.  Thus, one can consider a high 
price of protection or enforcement or a low benefit of enforcement to be more or 
less universally conducive to the creation of negative space.  This is not to say, 
however, that creators in these areas would not prefer a system that provided more 
affordable protection or enforcement or more beneficial enforcement.  No doubt, 
many would.  But when the system does not provide for affordable protection, 
these creators opt to create negative space by declining protection or enforcement 
and instead reinvesting in creation.  Thus, their innovation and creation benefits—
under the current system—more from a lack of protection than it would from 
protection.  If conditions changed, and protection or enforcement became more 
affordable or feasible, such creators might be able to reinvest without having to 
sacrifice protection or enforcement, and thus might benefit even more. 
Roller derby is a case in point.  Most derby participants have few resources and 
make no money from their derby activities.177  If a derby participant’s pseudonym 
is infringed, she will have a difficult time claiming actual damages, and an 
injunction action will be very expensive.178  Under this calculus, it is not worth it to 
for a derby participant to register her name as a trademark, much less to sue a 
copycat.  Yet, each participant wants a unique and distinctive moniker.  As a result, 
the participants have collectively built a sui generis trademark-like system to 
arbitrate name related conflicts among themselves.179  This system permits them to 
spend their time and money on participating in roller derby rather than in protecting 
their monikers, making roller derby more affordable.  This relative affordability 
permits more individuals to participate and create names of their own than would 
be able to if each name required investment in protection.  Voila:  negative space. 
The same cost-benefit analysis plays into the creation of negative space for 
fashion designs.  Many fashion designs could be protected by design patents, but 
few are.180  Why?  Design patents are expensive and time consuming to obtain; by 
the time a design patent issues, copies of the design will have come and gone, and 
the design will have gone out of style.181  Moreover, design patents protect only 
against infringers whose designs are either identical or equivalent to the original.182  
Thus, even designers of the most timeless fashions have relatively little to gain 
from obtaining design patents, especially considering how many designs a fashion 
house may generate in a single season.  Even if design patents were issued 
 
 177. See Fagundes, supra note 19, at 2. 
 178. Id. at 37. 
 179. Id. at 19–35 (describing roller derby’s internal registration and arbitration system). 
 180. Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1704-05. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (holding that 
“[t]hat which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier” and distinguishing two designs for similar 
rubber clogs based solely on differences in insole dimpling pattern) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
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instantaneously, the fashion industry might not benefit much from them, because it 
is often difficult to find and obtain damages from copyists, many of whom operate 
offshore, and even the preliminary injunction phase of a case could last longer than 
a couture design stays current.183  Given these considerations, fashion designers 
instead rely on first mover advantages and, as Raustiala and Sprigman have pointed 
out, the benefits of a faster fashion cycle brought on by copying.184 
There are, of course, two variables in this calculus: the cost of pursuing 
infringers and the likelihood and benefit of winning.  Occasionally, the potential 
benefit of winning may tip the scales in favor of suing.  This may be true in, for 
example, high tech or pharmaceutical patent litigation, where bet the company 
litigation may carry the chance of a high reward.  By the same token, an IP owner 
with a large purse may be willing to pursue a very small recovery if the cost of 
pursuit is small enough. 
a.  The Cost of Obtaining Protection and Pursuing Infringers 
The more it costs to obtain protection, the less likely creators are to seek it.  
Attorney fees and filing costs may seem daunting, especially to the creator whose 
filings are likely to require detailed prior art searching or patent drafting, or the 
creator with a relatively large portfolio of works.185  Similarly, although litigation is 
always expensive, some cases are more costly than others.  The cost goes up, for 
example, when infringers are difficult to find or identify; there is a high likelihood 
of counterclaims; or there is a significant public relations hazard in threatening the 
infringer.  In such circumstances, creators may prefer to invest their scarce 
resources in further creation, rather than investing in the protection of works 
already created or pursuit of infringers. 
Perhaps the most common of these is the hard-to-find infringer.  Tattoo parlors, 
for example, are decentralized, and unless a tattoo artist posts infringing designs on 
her wall or website, the only realistic way to find infringements is to see them on 
the uncovered skin of a consumer.186  For this reason, although tattoo piracy is 
common, there is very little litigation in the field aside from cases regarding tattoo 
“flash” (i.e., pre-made tattoo designs that an artist may post on her wall to be 
selected by walk in clients).187 
 
 183. See Beebe, supra note 117, at 864 (citations omitted); Hemphill & Suk, supra note 39, at 
1171. 
 184. Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1733. 
 185. See Graham et al., supra note 150, at 1310–14 (noting that across industries, but particularly 
for software and Internet startups, “[c]ost considerations loom large for startups in deciding to forgo 
patenting . . . . We find that, among technology startups, the cost of getting a patent is the most common 
reason cited for not patenting a major technology” and cost of enforcing patents is the second most cited 
reason); see also Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs:  An Empirical 
Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 133–34 (2010) (describing “the high costs of 
patenting and patent litigation” as a significant reason that startup companies decide not to obtain patent 
on new inventions). 
 186. Hatcher, supra note 92, at 4. 
 187. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1769. 
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The high probability of counterclaims likely contributes to what Raustiala and 
Sprigman have suggested is a negative space environment surrounding the 
microprocessor industry.188  Although there is a great deal of litigation in these 
areas, there is also a great deal of cross-licensing.189  This may be because, in a sea 
of claims and counter claims, it is cheaper and easier to skip ahead to the 
settlement. 
The high expense of protection and the low potential return from licensing or 
infringement disputes may also influence creators who produce a large number of 
relatively small works.  Bloggers, home photographers, wiki contributors and many 
others can produce hundreds of works per year.  Comedians may write dozens of 
jokes for a single performance. The time and money cost of registering those 
copyrights, identifying potential licensees or infringers and negotiating with 
prospective licensees loom as prohibitive for such individuals.  It is usually more 
efficient to forbear.  Those who still wish to resist copying may limit access to their 
works through password protection or subscription requirements; those who still 
crave revenue can rely on business models that are less dependent on exclusivity, 
such as advertising or subscription fees.  Those who wish to restrict what potential 
copyists can do with their work can use low-IP licenses, such as Creative 
Commons.190  As art director and game designer Daniel Solis tweeted, “For 
creators who dislike paperwork, Creative Commons is less altruism, more just 
avoiding a headache.”191 
There may also be nonmonetary costs to pursuing infringers, such as publicity 
and ostracism.  Magicians could not sue without revealing their secrets, so 
intellectual property protection, even if it were available, would be of limited 
usefulness.192  Likewise, even if film and television pitch ideas were protectable 
expressions, their creators might not pursue claims.  Movie and television studios 
feel free to copy both unprotectable ideas and protectable expressions when they 
are submitted, and creators stay mum out of fear of reprisal.  The writer who sues 
will “never eat lunch in this town again.”  Therefore, it is better to produce more 
and hope that the compensation will—sometimes—follow. 
b.  The Potential Benefits of Pursuing Infringers 
At the same time, IP owners must consider what they might gain from licensing 
their creations, how likely they are to win a case against an infringer and what the 
likely benefit of winning would be.  This depends on a number of factors:  the 
value and longevity of the work, the number and resources of potential infringers, 
 
 188. Id. at 1771–72. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Johnson, supra note 31, at 418–30 (suggesting alternative methods for easy licensing of 
such materials, such as Konomark and Copysquare, two low-formality IP licensing concepts pioneered 
by Prof. Eric Johnson). 
 191. Daniel Solis, Tweet by @danielsolis, TWITTER (Sept. 8, 2010, 8:59 AM), 
http://twitter.com/danielsolis. 
 192. See Loshin, supra note 10, at 132. 
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the crowdedness of the market and whether the creator, as opposed to someone 
else, will benefit from the pursuit. 
Inexpensive or short-lived creations may not be able to generate enough reward 
to merit pursuit.  As discussed above, neither the Patent Office nor the federal court 
system can match the pace of fashion.193  The same is true for software, considering 
that most programs may become obsolete before the twenty year window of patent 
protection will expire.  Indeed, considering that it can take more than three years to 
obtain a utility patent, a whole generation of software could be supplanted before 
receiving a patent.194  This is not to say that closed source software cannot be 
profitable, but it helps to explain the rise of the open source movement and its 
norms.  But for many software creators, the most efficient approach is to share their 
works, in the hope that doing so will foster collaboration and create a better product 
that profits through first mover advantages and network effects rather than 
exclusivity. 
The same holds true for relatively inexpensive works, such as snapshots and 
blog posts, or works with little or no independent monetary value, such as roller 
derby pseudonyms.  For these creators, formal licensing will seldom be worth the 
trouble.  The creators of such works—especially those who wish their works to be 
distributed and who wish to receive recognition for their works—would prefer low 
formality schemes such as Creative Commons. 
There is also the “whack-a-mole” problem, where stopping a single infringer is 
virtually meaningless because scores of others are waiting in the wings.  This is 
typical of domain name registration.  It costs roughly $10 to register a domain 
name, but a significant hourly rate for an attorney to write a cease and desist letter 
and even more—a minimum of $1,500 per proceeding—to pursue infringers using 
official means.  A trademark holder might be interested in stopping domain name 
speculators who register their marks as domain names or “typo-squatters” who 
register confusingly similar domains, but pursuing one infringer is futile, given the 
legion of others.  It is better to purchase all of the possibly infringing domains at 
$10 apiece, or to purchase online advertising that guides users to the mark holder’s 
official site or just to allow infringement. 
Litigation is similarly pointless when faced with a legion of noninfringing 
substitutes.  Of course, the adequacy of the substitute comes into play.  If I want to 
buy a novel by Neil Gaiman, a substitute by Neal Stephenson (while also likely to 
entertain) will not do the trick.  In contrast, if I want Manolo Blahnik shoes, I 
 
 193. See supra Part III.B.4. 
 194. See Mark E. Stallion, A Practical Overview of U.S. Patent Law Challenges and Strategy, in 
DEVELOPING A PATENT STRATEGY:  LEADING LAWYERS ON COUNSELING CLIENTS ON PATENT 
PROTECTION, EVALUATING PATENT PORTFOLIOS, AND WORKING WITH THE USPTO 219, 228 (Aspatore 
ed., 2010).  Stallion writes: 
The typical time to first office action on the merits for a software-related application is three to 
four years, with many cases stretching to four and a half years. Given the rapid changes in the 
software industry, the technology can become obsolete in four and a half years, which is 
obviously problematic. One can file for a petition to expedite, but this process is quite expensive. 
Id. 
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might—in a pinch—be able to make do with a similar style of shoe from Jimmy 
Choo.  Although shoes and novels are both plentiful, the benefit to Manolo Blahnik 
of being able to sue one of the many makers of pumps is not as great as the benefit 
to Random House of being able to sue an unlicensed republisher of Neil Gaiman’s 
books, because shoes are more similar to each other, and thus more fungible, than 
novels.  As a result, shoes reside in negative space, and popular fiction does not. 
If a work’s value is high enough, or if litigation would serve as a deterrent, it 
may be worthwhile to pursue infringers even in a whack-a-mole setting or where 
there are many noninfringing substitutes.195  Ordinarily, however, if there is no 
unitary conduit with whom one could bargain for licenses, or a unitary defendant 
one might sue for inducing or contributing to individual infringements, it is usually 
not worth it.  The money is better spent on increased technological protections, 
education, production, innovation or product improvement.  In this circumstance, 
like other negative space circumstances, IP forbearance may lead to increased 
innovation/creation, because producers are forced to innovate more quickly to take 
advantage of first mover advantages. 
The more difficult it is to prove infringement and enforce a judgment, the less 
worthwhile pursuit becomes.  Thus, negative space is more likely to arise when the 
infringement analysis is subjective or speculative.  This is particularly true for 
perfumes and cuisine: even if they received copyright-style protection, the 
subjectivity of sensory perception would make it difficult to predict whether a jury 
would find two flavors or aromas to be “substantially similar.”  The presence of 
substantial similarity between two competing stand-up comedy jokes is similarly 
difficult to adjudicate, especially since the same joke “idea” can be expressed in 
different, equally funny, ways.196  Enforcement difficulties also arise, as many 
comedians are judgment proof.  As a result, stand-up comedians favor a system of 
norms that bans copying of both expression and ideas, and relies on social 
enforcement mechanisms.  Enforcement difficulties also influence the creation of 
negative space in fashion, where copyists are typically offshore, and in the hairstyle 
and tattoo industries, where injunctions would range from impractical to 
unacceptable.197 
 
 195. The statutory damages provisions of the Copyright Act help to alleviate this gap in protection; 
however, the cost of litigation can easily overtake the benefit of receiving statutory damages.  See 17 
U.S.C. §504 (2006) (providing limits of statutory damages).  Trademark and patent law have no 
equivalent damages scheme for pursuing infringers of inexpensive creations.  The existence of statutory 
damages, the large resource pool available to large record companies, and the educational effect of 
making public targets of infringers, may help explain why the field of popular music has not (yet) fallen 
entirely into the zone of negative space.  Arguably, the industry’s continued production of music despite 
rampant infringement might qualify it as (at least an emerging) example of negative space, but as a 
matter of law and practice, those who copy the music of established popular music artists are still 
viewed as infringers and still risk paying potential damages.  As discussed below, however, even the 
availability of statutory damages does not erase the distinction between the music of established popular 
artists, which exists in a high-IP environment, and the music of emerging and struggling artists, which 
often exists in a low-IP, forbearance based environment. 
 196. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1795–98 (recounting two jokes that share ideas, but 
have no identical expression). 
 197. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 39, at 1171 (describing practices of offshore fashion 
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In some circumstances, creators may create a bubble of negative space if they 
have assigned or licensed away their rights and thus would not be the ones 
benefiting from enforcement.  Take, for example, bands like OK Go that post their 
videos on YouTube.  Internet posting of videos may be an excellent marketing tool 
for the band—as IP forbearance, it serves the band’s preference for recognition 
over exclusivity—but it also permits some people to go to YouTube instead of 
buying their album, which harms record companies.  As a result, record companies 
have opposed such postings.198  Yet, such bands persist because any infringement 
suits would benefit only the record companies.199  Academics also share their 
scholarly research out of a preference for recognition over exclusivity—and do so 
over the general objections of academic publishers, who want to sell books and 
journals.  This tension leads to a sort of negative space among creators, with an 
overlay of sometimes unpredictable enforcement by IP assignees or exclusive 
licensees. 
III.  NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
This Article is far from the first to observe that intellectual property law is only 
one of many mechanisms for encouraging innovation and creation, and often not 
the best such mechanism.  What this Article aims to contribute is a sense of when 
intellectual property law may not be the best mechanism for promoting innovation 
and creation, and what takes the place of legal protection as a motivator in those 
cases.  By looking at what makes traditional intellectual property protection 
unhelpful or counterproductive in negative space situations, and by looking at what 
creators and innovators value in those situations, we can begin to extrapolate how 
to improve our systems for promoting innovation and creation.200  This may 
involve augmenting some current protections and diminishing others. 
This Article does not propose that the law remove intellectual property 
protection for all works that are amenable to negative space treatment.  Although a 
low-IP environment promotes creation in areas amenable to negative space 
treatment, the existence of possible IP protection also benefits the creators of these 
types of works in some way.  With the potential intellectual property protection as a 
backstop, creators can create without fear of what will happen when fragile norms 
break down; in the shadow of patent and copyright law, open innovators can enter 
 
copyists). 
 198. See Damian Kulash, Open Letter from OK Go, Regarding Non-Embeddable YouTube Videos, 
OK GO (Jan. 18, 2010, 6:16 PM), http://okgo.forumsunlimited.com/index.php?showtopic=4169. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See Beebe, supra note 117, at 885–88; Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?, supra note 79, at 1460–
62 (arguing that more creation is not always better, since increased creation may come at the cost of 
quality and may result in the exploitation of creators).  Thus, these scholars suggest that, rather than 
merely seeking to promote creation and innovation, intellectual property law should seek to optimize 
creation and innovation.  While well taken, this point is not at the heart of the present Article.  The 
extent to which the proposals herein would be effective at optimizing creation and innovation—as 
opposed to merely promoting them—is a matter for further research and analysis. 
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into automatic licensing schemes.201  And creators may have individual reasons for 
preferring protection to forbearance; after all, only some of the creators and 
innovators who have the option of engaging in IP forbearance, actually do. 
In addition, the circumstances that create negative space are not—as other 
scholars have implied—uniformly applicable to all works in any given industry.  
Indeed, they can vary from work to work, change over the life of a work, or change 
over the productive life of a creator.  Industries change, and with these changes 
may come the creation or erosion of negative space.202  As a given type of work 
becomes more popular or profitable, for example, the IP owner may become more 
interested in seeking protection or pursuing infringers.203  And the benefits of a 
low-IP environment may grow or fade for a single creator over time.  Popular 
musician Lily Allen, who became famous through file sharing of her recordings, is 
one of many such musicians who are now considerably more interested in formal 
intellectual property than they were when trying to gain fans.204  This implies that 
while negative space may in many circumstances be preferable to traditional 
intellectual property protection, it is not always a permanently optimal state.  When 
a particular work or industry is well suited for negative space treatment, it may not 
remain so.  This, too, counsels against wholesale erasure of rights. 
Nor do I propose that the law eliminate doctrinal carve outs and fill the 
protection gaps of doctrinal no man’s land.  Despite the benefits of possible 
protection discussed above, these gaps and carve outs not only permit negative 
space to thrive (a benefit in itself), but also generally serve some other public 
interest, such as providing free access to medical techniques, permitting free speech 
or facilitating communication.  If creators had the opportunity to obtain protection 
in these areas—because their interests are changeable, as discussed above—it is 
likely that some would do so.  This would not only lead to a constriction of public 
access, but would also harm other creators by taking away their raw materials and 
undermining the norms that keep productivity alive in the absence of protection.  
Providing the opportunity for protection in these areas could therefore result in the 
collapse of negative spaces that benefit the public. 
Rather than suggesting wholesale changes in the configuration of negative 
space, I propose more nuanced revisions.  The common factors described above 
suggest what drives creation when creators or the public interest do not favor 
exclusivity.  Regardless of whether intellectual property protection is available, 
harnessing these motivators would do an even better job of promoting creation and 
innovation than intellectual property law alone.  In addition, knowing what may 
make a lack of protection preferable to protection can suggest ways in which 
current intellectual property rules may be optimized to promote creation and 
innovation.  When viewed as a whole, therefore, observations drawn from the 
 
 201. See generally Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?, supra note 79, at 1448 (positing that the existence 
of negative spaces does not render intellectual property law unnecessary). 
 202. See Dreyfuss, Fragile Equilibria, supra note 116, at 2–3. 
 203. See Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 198. 
 204. See Leaver, supra note 140, at 1. 
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theory can be used to develop normative approaches. 
A.  ENCOURAGE ATTRIBUTION 
The first is the rather uncontroversial observation that a desire for recognition is 
a powerful driver of innovation and creation, and that attribution is both reward and 
incentive for creation.  Although this is not a revolutionary assertion, it is one that 
pops into relief when observing IP’s negative space, because the desire for 
recognition seems so frequently intertwined with creating or perpetuating negative 
space.  The desire for recognition encourages creators to engage in IP forbearance, 
such as attribution-dependent licensing, wiki creation and academic sharing.  
Attribution also contributes to community building, first mover advantages and 
other nonexclusivity-based bases for creation.  This leads to the conclusion that the 
law could better promote creation and innovation if it were structured to encourage 
attribution. 
There are risks to emphasizing attribution.  Some commentators, including 
Rebecca Tushnet, have wisely pointed out that in the copyright context, attribution 
may be difficult to achieve in certain circumstances such as live broadcasting; that 
an attribution right might be difficult to adjudicate for works derived from multiple 
sources; and that it is difficult to attribute works made for hire and works owned by 
multiple rights holders.205  Outside the copyright context, attribution becomes even 
more difficult.  Should an automobile maker be required to identify the inventors of 
every patented part in the car?  Should the maker of a smartphone be required to 
identify the inventors of every piece of software incorporated into the phone?  If so, 
how?  It is harder yet to envision how a trademark attribution right would work, 
since trademarks are themselves source identifiers.  In any setting, an automatic 
attribution right, if piled atop traditional intellectual property protection, could be 
as great a disincentive to create as it is an incentive: creators would have to fear not 
only traditional infringement suits, but also attribution-based suits in situations 
where attribution is difficult. 
These criticisms are sound.  But that does not mean we should give up on the 
idea of encouraging attribution—only that attribution is not a panacea for all that 
ails the traditional intellectual property system.206  It may still be both possible and 
advisable to create a low-formality formal attribution right to which, for example, 
individual creators could opt in; or to provide creators with the opportunity to elect 
between a copyright and an attribution right.207  Less dramatic approaches include 
considering attribution among the factors in adjudicating copyright fair use, 
 
 205. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights:  Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 
789, 789 (2007) (positing that “identifying authors is beyond” the grasp of American copyright law). 
 206. See Fisk, supra note 85, at 108–17.  There may also be a number of other potential benefits to 
formalizing attribution regimes, beyond mere encouragement of attribution.  While outside the scope of 
this Article, Fisk offers a more detailed discussion of various pros and cons of formalizing attribution, as 
well as ideas for operationalizing such a formal system so as to promote the benefits of recognition.  Id. 
 207. This may be what many creators (incorrectly) believe they are doing when they select to 
license their work under a Creative Commons attribution-only license. 
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imposing an attribution requirement as a form of injunctive relief or considering 
attribution as an ameliorating factor in assessing damages.  Identifying the best 
approach is a subject for future scholarship.  Whatever the conclusion, however, it 
is apparent that encouraging attribution would promote creation and innovation by 
giving a greater number of creators and innovators the means to extract benefit 
from their creations. 
B.  PERMIT “PRODUCTIVE INFRINGEMENT” 
The second observation is that there is a symbiotic relationship between 
negative space and “productive infringement”—infringing activity that adds value 
to the infringed work or produces new creations without diminishing the value of 
the original work.  Negative space may arise in order to provide opportunities for 
productive infringement as it does in the context of open source software 
development and academic science, or productive infringement may facilitate the 
growth of negative space as it does for fan fiction communities.208 
This implies that leaving room for productive infringement will not unduly 
compromise—and may even promote—the incentives that underlie initial creation 
and innovation.  Thus, in contexts where productive infringement is likely to occur, 
there may be both public benefits and productivity benefits in loosening the 
standards for infringement.  In the copyright and trademark contexts, Christopher 
Sprigman has proposed a system that asks whether an infringement competes with 
the original.209  He argues that there is a distinction between counterfeiting and 
other sorts of infringement: counterfeiting should be prohibited because it will 
always have some effect on the market for the original; other sorts of infringement 
should be adjudicated based on whether the infringing product competes with the 
original.210  For example, derivative works may not harm authors not positioned to 
exploit licensing markets, and unforeseeable copying, as a matter of logic, cannot 
affect incentives.211  Although Sprigman does not discuss patent law, his theory can 
be extended by analogy to promote productive patent infringements. 
According to this approach, the law can, and should, be structured to create 
broader exemptions for infringements that do not harm creators’ incentives.  For 
example, the existence of negative space in the context of academic science implies 
that broadening the experimental use exception for patent infringement would 
benefit, rather than stifle, innovation.212  Along the same lines, the proliferation of 
 
 208. See generally Fiesler, supra note 144. 
 209. Christopher Jon Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 
L. 317, 334–41 (2009). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?, supra note 79, at 1469–70.  A more dramatic application of the 
same principle might categorically eliminate patent suits by nonpracticing entities.  To my mind, such an 
extreme step would be counter-productive as nonpracticing entities often provide key sources of income 
for inventors and, as such, have become part of the invention economy.  Thus, while eliminating the 
opportunity for nonpracticing entities to sue would likely permit more opportunities for follow-on 
invention, it would also have a significant, indirect undermining effect on the incentives for initial 
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attribution-based noncommercial copyright licenses suggests that broadening fair 
use style exemptions for the creation of noncommercial derivative works is likely 
to promote both initial creation of works and further creation.  An explicit 
exemption for expressive and/or nominative uses of trademarks would generate 
similar public benefits without impairing the value of marks.213 
Another, less dramatic approach would be to eliminate injunctive relief and/or 
limit the opportunities for damages in the context of productive infringement.  This 
would not only reduce the risk of engaging in productive infringement, but would 
also permit the growth of beneficial negative spaces.  A reduction in remedies will 
decrease the potential benefit of pursuing infringers, so that only those who have 
experienced genuine harm, or those with large pocketbooks, will be interested in 
pursuing productive infringers. 
C.  RESIST THE URGE TO PROTECT FIRST AND ASK QUESTIONS LATER 
The third observation is that overprotection can be as damaging to creation as 
underprotection.  As a result, we should resist the urge to “protect first and ask 
questions later.”  A steady stream of scholars and business interests have urged 
broad interpretations of current infringement laws or proposed new protections that 
would fill in the gaps of doctrinal no man’s land.  Lobbyists and scholars alike have 
argued for statutory protection of fashion designs; the “hot news” doctrine has 
experienced a recent resurgence; various constituencies have encouraged us to 
adopt European database protection standards; and the debate over the patentability 
of business methods rages on.214 
The negative space analysis teaches that intellectual property protection is, for 
the most part, unnecessary in these and similar areas.  Each fits well into the 
negative space rubric because each experiences powerful first mover advantages 
and network effects.  Fashion’s place in negative space has been well 
documented.215  Hot news is, by definition, significantly more valuable to first 
movers than to others, and those able to broadcast information first will, in this age 
of electronic customer mobility, be able to capture a larger market share.  
Promoting creation of hot news therefore means promoting speed, by forcing 
creators to rely on first mover advantages, rather than preventing copying.  As 
discussed above, electronic databases experience significant first mover 
advantages, and thus do not require greater intellectual property protection as a 
 
invention. 
 213. Cf. Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use in Entertainment, 
61 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1073–74 (2009) (proposing exemption for “artistically relevant” uses of 
trademarks in expressive works). 
 214. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”:  The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing the relatively recent resurgence of the “hot news” 
misappropriation doctrine); Hemphill & Suk, supra note 39, at 1184–90 (proposing tailored protection 
for fashion designs); Jad Mills, Patentable Subject Matter in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), 
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 377 (2010) (discussing effect of recent ruling on patentability of business 
method patents). 
 215. See generally Sprigman & Raustiala, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5. 
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creation incentive.216  Tellingly, a 2005 European Commission study indicated that 
there was no conclusive data regarding whether the E.U. Database Directive had 
any significant influence on database production, but that the U.S. database 
industry, which operates in a relative low-IP environment, was growing faster than 
the E.U.’s, which operates under a sui generis protection system.217  Many 
commentators have observed that a sort of first mover advantage applies to 
business methods as well: If a business method is genuinely superior, it does not 
require patent protection to benefit those who create it—and if it is not superior, no 
one will use it.218  Those who invent superior business methods do not require 
patents to encourage invention, and those who invent inferior business methods 
will not benefit from patents.  Thus, they argue, business method patents serve 
chiefly to increase transaction costs.219 
Also, because overprotection can be as damaging as underprotection, the 
intellectual property system would benefit from providing a genuine opportunity 
for creators to abandon their copyrights.  Patent law provides for abandonment of 
one’s inventions and dedication to the public; trademark law permits abandonment 
of marks in a variety of ways.220  Each of these measures creates opportunities for 
follow-on inventions and creations.  Yet it is strikingly difficult, if not impossible, 
to abandon one’s copyright.221  Many creators may believe this is what they are 
doing when they license their works under Creative Commons and similar licenses, 
yet such licenses actually create additional layers of protection under contract law 
 
 216. See supra Part III.B.1.c. 
 217. DG Internal Market and Services Working Paper, First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on 
the Legal Protection of Databases, at 20, 22–24 (Dec. 12, 2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/evaluation/evaluationdatabasesdirective.pdf. 
 218. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1618.  Burk & Lemley write: 
As many commentators have noted, however, companies have ample incentives to develop 
business methods even without patent protection, because the competitive marketplace rewards 
companies that use more efficient business methods.  Even if competitors copy these methods, 
first mover advantages and branding can provide rewards to the innovator.  Because new 
business methods do not generally require substantial investment in R&D, the prospect of even a 
modest supracompetitive reward will provide sufficient incentive to innovate. 
Id. 
 219. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (“Business 
innovations, by their very nature, provide a competitive advantage and thus generate their own 
incentives.”); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 340 (2008) (arguing that firms need incentives for “market experimentation” 
when first mover or branding advantages prove insufficient); Dreyfuss, Business Method Patents, supra 
note 96, at 275. 
 220. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C § 102(c) (2006) (providing for loss of right to patent if inventor has 
abandoned the invention); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 614 (1950) 
(“What is not specifically claimed is dedicated to the public.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) 
(providing for abandonment of a mark when “its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume 
such use” and “[w]hen any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as 
commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection 
with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark”). 
 221. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons:  Termination of Copyright Licenses and 
Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 391–99 (2010) (describing copyright 
abandonment as a “paper tiger”). 
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rather than freeing the work in any permanent sense.222  Considering the 
changeability of the negative space calculus, most creators may not want to 
abandon their rights permanently—making withdrawable automatic licenses 
appealing.  For the same reason, some creators, particularly those who have already 
benefited from first mover advantages, may wish to abandon their rights.  In order 
to generate the productivity benefits of negative space, the system should permit 
them to do so. 
D.  REDUCE THE COST OF OBTAINING AND ENFORCING IP RIGHTS 
Finally, it is tempting to conclude from this analysis that the high cost of 
obtaining and enforcing intellectual property rights does not harm the incentive 
function of intellectual property law.  One could conclude that, since innovators 
and creators may elect to create even when they cannot afford protection, the price 
of protection is no impediment to creation.  But it is equally valid to conclude—
considering the lack of controls on this experiment—that if protection and 
enforcement were less expensive, even more creators and innovators would come 
out of the woodwork.  This hypothesis finds support in the fact that when sui 
generis norms based protection systems have arisen, they have often mirrored 
existing intellectual property rules. Roller derby participants who cannot afford the 
formalities of trademark law have devised a system that resembles the multifactor 
test applied in trademark cases; stand-up comics who cannot afford the formalities 
of copyright law abide by rules that tweak copyright’s idea-expression dichotomy, 
but echo its substantial similarity requirement.223  This implies that in some cases, 
creators are opting out of intellectual property law not because they don’t like it, or 
not only because they don’t like it, but because it is just too expensive.  True, some 
are willing to take the risk of infringement, either because norms exist to protect 
them or because they continue to value recognition or community, but some may 
not be.  An expensive intellectual property system excludes the latter group.  To the 
extent that any potential creator would find greater incentive in the intellectual 
property system, they should not be excluded from it solely on the basis of price. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
By identifying who creates IP’s negative space and what makes a particular type 
of work well suited to reside in negative space, we can learn about the traditional 
intellectual property system itself.  To date, most scholarship concerning IP’s 
negative space has focused on case studies of particular industries and social 
movements that occupy IP’s negative space.  This Article builds upon that work to 
draw conclusions about the benefits of low-IP systems, and how those benefits can 
be translated to the current intellectual property regime. 
Specifically, IP’s negative space occupies three territories: (1) doctrinal no 
 
 222. See Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?, supra note 79, at 1449. 
 223. See Fagundes, supra note 19, at 17–18; Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1822. 
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man’s land, in which creations fall through the cracks of IP protection; (2) areas of 
IP forbearance, in which creators could receive protection, but choose either not to 
seek protection or not to pursue infringers; and (3) use-based carve outs, in which 
lawmakers have exempted certain types of intellectual property use from 
infringement liability. 
Lawmakers, creators and users create these negative spaces under several 
potentially overlapping conditions.  Works are well suited to negative space when 
(1) creation is significantly driven by something other than exclusivity based 
financial gain; (2) granting exclusivity would significantly harm or deter other 
creation or innovation; (3) the public interest in free access to information is higher 
than the risk of reduced production from diminished exclusivity incentives; and/or 
(4) creators prefer to reinvest scarce resources in further creation than in protection 
or enforcement of intellectual property, which is most likely to occur when the cost 
of obtaining or enforcing protection is greater than the benefit to be gained from 
enforcement. 
These common theories of negative space lead to four core observations about 
intellectual property law.  The first is that a desire for recognition can be a powerful 
driver of creation, and intellectual property protection may undermine a creator’s 
ability to receive recognition.  The second is that that there is a symbiotic 
relationship between negative space and “productive infringement,” which builds 
on existing works and technology to create new creations and innovations.  The 
third is that intellectual property protection is capable of inhibiting public access to 
creations and inventions and thereby hampering public knowledge, creation and 
innovation.  The fourth is that intellectual property rights are often so costly to 
obtain and enforce that creators would prefer to invest resources in production than 
in IP protection or enforcement. 
While these observations are far from new, they have often been used to argue 
that intellectual property law is unnecessary or detrimental to creation.  I posit that, 
on the contrary, their connection with IP’s negative space counsels in favor of a far 
more measured approach.  Specifically, these tenets apply on the margins of 
intellectual property law, where creation and innovation thrive without the promise 
of exclusivity.  They demonstrate that, to a large degree, a proclivity for negative 
space treatment is not necessarily inherent in a particular industry or creative 
community.  Although the desirability of protection may depend in part on extra-
legal factors such as community culture, most hinge on traits of current intellectual 
property law.  Thus, changes in law could lead to changes in negative spaces, 
making different creative communities better or worse suited to low-IP 
environments, or making certain industries or creative communities less likely to 
shun protection. 
I do not mean to suggest that creators, consumers or anyone else would benefit 
from a system designed to motivate creators to seek protection.  Far from it: since 
protection is useful only inasmuch as it acts as a motivator of creation, the key 
insight here is the knowledge of what may make a lack of protection preferable to 
protection.  That knowledge gives us a new tool for optimizing intellectual property 
law to promote creation and innovation.  Applying that knowledge, I propose that 
ROSENBLATT Corrections .docx 5/13/2011  3:47 PM 
2011] A THEORY OF IP’S NEGATIVE SPACE 365 
intellectual property law would be well served by systems that encourage 
attribution, permit “productive infringement,” resist the urge to protect works when 
protection is not necessary to encourage creation and reduce the cost of obtaining 
and enforcing intellectual property rights. 
 
